U.S. Army Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordination Authority
Relationships & Bounded Rationality
Dissertation Proposal
.
School of Business and Technology Management
in Partial Fulfillment of the
Requirements for the Degree of
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY
Chapter 1: Introduction 5
Statement of the Problem 9
Purpose of the Study 10
Theoretical/Conceptual Framework 11
Nature of the Study 13
Research Questions 14
Significance of the Study 15
Definition of Key Terms 15
Summary 17
Chapter 2: Literature Review 19
Theoretical/Conceptual Framework 19
Theoretical considerations for the Theory of Bounded Reality. 20
The theory of bounded rationality 23
Individual versus organizational rationality 27
The limits (bounds) of rationality theories 30
Risk and uncertainty 30
Incomplete information about alternatives 35
Assuming Complexity 36
Risk Management 38
Bounded rationality versus irrationality 42
Bounded Rationality and Approaches to Countering WMD 45
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD) 48
Mid-level managers’ approaches to Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction. 51
Enduring skills and recollection 52
Recollection 54
The Restrictions of a Coordinating Authority 55
Harmonization with various authorities 57
Bounded Rationality and Applicability within the US Army 62
Applicability within the US Army 66
Chapter 3: Research Method 73
Research Methodology and Design 77
Replicable Study Procedure 78
Population and Sample 81
Materials/Instrumentation 82
Qualitative Research Designs 84
Ethnography Approach 84
Narrative Approach 84
Phenomenological Approach 85
Grounded Theory 85
Case Study Approach 86
Operational Definitions of Variables 88
Study Procedures 90
Data Collection and Analysis 90
Assumptions 91
Limitation 92
Ethical Assurances 93
Summary 95
References 100
Chapter 1: Introduction
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11), forced the formers and the
current President of the United States (POTUS) on the threats weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) represent against the United States and its allies (White House,
2017). State and non-state actors desire to proliferate and acquire weapons of mass
destruction is on the rise, thereby making the risk of weapons of mass destruction
employment by terrorist organizations plausible and more importantly unpredictable
(White House, 2017). As recently demonstrated by the Democratic People’s Republic of
Korea (DPRK) and by the Syrian regime, states are willing to acquire and proliferate
weapons of mass destruction (Eweiss, 2016; Terrell, Hagen, & Ryba Jr., 2016; White
House, 2017).
The Syrian regime use of chemical weapons against its citizens has “undermined
international norms” (pg. 8) against the employment of these cruel and vicious weapons
(White House, 2017). Consequently, the decay of global norms reemphasizes the
importance of Department of Defense mission of countering weapons of mass destruction
(CWMD) after the nefarious terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 (9/11) (Bonds et al..,
2014; White House, 2017). Terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda and now the Islamic State
of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) continue to be the highest threats faced by America and its allies
since the events of 9/11 (Jentleson, 2014; Meulenbelt & Nieuwenhuizen, 2015; White
House, 2017). ISIS and Al-Qaeda are willing to take numerous lives without the
employment of weapons of mass destruction; these organizations, however, without
hesitation will take thousands of lives with a single weapon of mass destruction (Bonds et
al., 2014; Meulenbelt & Nieuwenhuizen, 2015; White House, 2017).
The United States and its allies believe with a high level of confidence that
terrorist organizations such as ISIS and Al-Qaeda are already pursuing the acquisition of
weapons of mass destruction despite the strict treaties and international laws against the
WMD use and acquisition (Bonds et al., 2014; Jentleson, 2014; White House, 2017;
Siniver, 2016). Subsequently, the international community in coordination with
established coalitions continue to develop and collaborate to appropriately prevent the
terrorist acquisition of these evil instruments of power and mass destruction (Bonds et al.,
2014; Lotan, 2015; White House, 2017; Siniver, 2016). Consequently, the United States
massive overhaul of the Defense of Department’s countering WMD focus since the
events of 9/11 continues to evolve, thus preventing terrorist organizations from acquiring
WMDs (Bonds et al., 2014; Murgado, 2013; White House, 2017).
For instance, the nefarious terrorist events of 9/11 forced the Defense Department
to align the threat of WMDs with a combatant command capable of integrating and
synchronizing the mission of countering WMD globally (Rumsfeld, 2005; Department of
Defense [DOD], 2007). Subsequently, the then Secretary of the Defense (SECDEF),
Donald Rumsfeld assigned this responsibility to the then Commander U.S. Strategic
Command (USSTRATCOM) (Rumsfeld, 2005; DOD, 2007). Secretary Rumsfeld,
understood that to effectively counter WMDs the alignment of the Center for Countering
Weapons of Mass Destruction with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency was necessary
to provide critical recommendations regarding countering WMD to senior DOD
leadership (Mauroni, 2010; Rumsfeld, 2005). The alignment placed counter WMD
subject matter experts (SMEs) in an advantage for collaboration, synchronization, and for
the recommendation of unified courses of actions to decision-makers when evaluating
WMDs threats globally (Duelfer, 2016; Mauroni, 2010; Rumsfeld, 2005).
The critical threat of WMD cause alignments within the DOD, and also influence
the alignments within its military departments (Cigar, 2014; Department of the Army
[DA], 2008). The Department of the Army, for example, revamped the United States
Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency and re-designated it as the U.S Army Nuclear and
Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction Agency (USANCA) (Bonds et al., 2014; DA,
2008). USANCA’s mission after the reorganization includes providing operational
planning support, integration and synchronization of CWMD planning and training and
advocating for countering-WMD capabilities for the U.S. Army (Bonds et al., 2014; DA,
2008).
As the agency responsible for the integration and synchronization of countering
WMD, USANCA collaborates with the Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction
Proliferation and Policy Division (hereafter referred as DAMO-SSD) (Bonds et al., 2014;
(Bonds et al., 2014; DA, 2008). Just like USANCA, DAMO-SSD is entrusted with the
advocating, synchronizing, and supporting countering-WMD across the Army on behalf
of the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff G-3/5/7 (Bonds et al., 2014; DA, 2008; Lotan,
2015). Additionally, DAMO-SSD provides oversight for the Army’s Nuclear, Chemical,
and Biological (NCB) surety, the weapons of mass destruction (WMD) non-proliferation
policy, and the counter CWMD proliferation capabilities programs and CWMD
deterrence (Bonds et al., 2014; DA, 2008)
According to Cronin &Cronin (2007), conditions exist to increase deterrence
analysis to the scholarly agenda of 21st-century defense studies. The condition exists
since the nation’s capability to adjust WMD proliferation deterrence to a multiplicity of
threats from resilient and resourceful adversaries appears limited (Cronin & Cronin,
2007; Duelfer, 2016; Hoffman, 2016; Jentleson, 2014). Additionally, academic texts
have noted (Handel, 2001; Kissinger, 1994; Summers, 1992), the link of National
Security strategies with DOD decision-making theories (Adamsky, 2013, 2014;
Bartholomees, 2010; Ben-Haim, 2016). Langlois & Langlois (2017) state that the United
States government and international government strategies frequently trust the rational
deterrence theory (RDT) as the national security decision-making foundation.
The RDT contends that individuals take rational actions to increase their highest
security concerns and interests; likewise, their actions will differ within like
circumstances, groups/teams, or persons (Langlois & Langlois, 2017; Lamb, 2016;
Miller, 2013). According to Lidz (2018), rational actor theory appears to be
uncomplicated; however, if executed it becomes complex. Though, Weiskopf &
Willmott (2013) emphasize that DOD strategic decision-making utilize two critical
fundamentals: (a) an ethical, well-synchronized rational evaluation of options, and (b)
brilliant judgment and individual intuition that demonstrate bounded rationality to speed
up decision-making during critical times.
In 1961 Herber Simon described bounded rationality as the indication that “the
capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems” is small
compared with the size of the problems whose solution is required for rational behavior
in the real world” (Simon, 1978, p. 198, 202). The theory of bounded rationality (TBR)
suggests that reasonably psychological rationality induces connection, impact design, and
authenticated decision rationality (Meier, Favero & Ling, 2015; Stanczyk, Foerstle, Busse
& Blome, 2015). As discussed previously, analyzing and understanding the countering
WMD and deterrence, and Simon’s TBR in the Department of the Army can provide an
academic appreciation for rationality.
Statement of the Problem
Case studies organized by the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR)
discovered that the United States Government (USG) misunderstand how to approach
complex national security policy issues (Dicicco, 2014; Flournoy & Brimley, 2006;
Travers, Van Boven & Judd, 2014). Compounded national security policy issues like
terrorism and WMD proliferation continues to go through an old-fashioned National
Security Council (NSC) system (Dicicco, 2014; Flournoy & Brimley, 2006; Travers, Van
Boven & Judd, 2014). According to Flournoy & Brimley (2006), the NSC system
appears to have a defective decision-making process, fill with bureaucracies unnecessary
for quick critical decision-making. Smith & McKune (2011), past studies revealed
national security processes interrupts, deteriorates, and stalemates certain conclusions
that forces Agency Secretaries (Dicicco, 2014; Nyuur, 2015; Van Boven & Judd, 2014)
to resolve problems independently from the formal decision-making system. According
to Weiskopf & Willmott (2013), national security policy fiascoes and faulty decision-
making outcomes could be the loss of American citizens lives, wealth, and sway, as well
as the too damage the countries national security.
Siniver & Lucas (2016) assert that President Obama’s decision to engage on an air
campaign against the Islamic State of Iraq and Levant (ISIL) without establishing a
global coalition whom the international community considered responsible for the
middle-eastern “up-rise.” President Obama asserted that ISIL’s evil ways affect not only
the middle-eastern states and their citizens but also the U.S. strategic interests and
neighboring states (Goodman, 2016; Siniver & Lucas, 2016). Consequently, President
Obama’s failed decision to stop ISIL from spreading across the middle-east by only
engaging in an air campaign intensified the global and domestic opinion on the ability of
the United States to lead and resolve complicated international efforts (Goodman, 2016).
As the difficulty of national security matters expands, decision-makers at all levels must
seek alternative theories or methods that can support the connection of military goals to
strategic national security ambitions (Miller, 2013; Siniver & Lucas, 2016).
Purpose of the Study
The proposed qualitative case study will analyze how mid-level managers at
USANCA and DAMO-SSD use their harmonization authority to make countering WMD
decisions and Simon’s TBR for decision-making (Simon, 1961, 1978, 1997). The case
study will employ Simon’s TBR to expand the academic understanding of : (1) USANCA
& DAMO-SSD midlevel managers’ enduring skill to recollect distinctive countering
WMD information and (2) within the restrictions of a coordination authority association
the techniques they retrieved this material in their decision-making method for winding
WMD dilemmas (Ben-Haim, 2016; Duelfer, 2016; Hochschild & Einstein, 2015; Lotan,
2015). According to Gurnani et al.. (2014), bounded rationality exploration still require
in the area of risk management, especially with large populations. Conversely, Sarker et
al.. (2016), claims that decision-making becomes challenging to examine since decision-
makers sway between bounded rationality to irrationality. Alvi &Gvosdev (2010) and
Duelfer (2016), exploration on the national security decision-making method for
countering WMD decisions is necessary to appreciate the political, structural, and social
influences that can provide useful lessons learned that could pertain to potential
decisions.
Theoretical/Conceptual Framework
The proposed study’s theoretical framework originates on Simon’s Theory of
Bounded Rationality (TBR) for decision-making (Simon, 1961, 1997). The TBR focus,
when developed by Simon, was about administrative decision-making constraints foisted
by time, the technology available, the budget, the availability of information, and the
human aptitude (Rizun & Taranenko, 2014; Simon, 1961, 1997). Simon’s TBR
fundamentally suggests that individuals make decisions in an ambiguous environment
with rough time and evidence (Rizun & Taranenko, 2014; Simon 1961, 1997).
Subsequently, Simon claimed that not having complete information hindered decision-
makers from making rational decisions, thereby triggering a “satisficing” decision or
selecting a suitable substitute to decipher the problem (Rizun & Taranenco, 2014; Simon,
1991, 1997).
Theory of Bounded Rationality (TBR). TBR as explain by Simon (1985,
1991), can be employed by a business or organization to make challenging issues into
adaptable ones. Theoretical considerations Simon’s TBR included were (1) individuals
[humans] are not intellectually capable of making rational decisions since humans can
only understand a limited amount of data at a given time, (2) individuals cannot visualize
every possible answer to a particular problem, and consequently, individuals are unable
to consider all relevant options, (3) wide-ranging analysis of a specific issue was
unreasonable due to the limited accessibility of evidence, knowledge, and time (Morselli,
2015; Stanczyk et al., 2015). Convoluted organizations charged to execute the decisions
of the government fit the broad practice of bounded rationality when pursuing solutions
to problems filled with difficulty and ambiguity (Simon, 1978; Simon, 1985; Simon,
1997). Simon explained, in situations where organizations problem-solving became
burdensome, leaders elected to bring to a halt the quest for rational solutions and pursued
alternative “satisfactory” decisions and not merely the top imaginable ones (Rizun &
Raranenko, 2014; Simon, 1985,1997; Stanczyk et al., 2015). Simon continued by
asserting that the satisfactory decisions often replaced conceptual, strategic goals with
attainable and quantifiable intermediate objectives (Simon, 1985,1997). Successively,
these objectives are fragmented and coordinated amongst professionals through the
employment of infrastructures and influence structure (Nyuur, 2015; Simon, 1985, 1997;
Stanczyk et al., 2015).
Nature of the Study
The study will use a qualitative single-case study that employs nonprobability,
focused sampling to interview O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14 midlevel managers SMEs, and to
investigate how within USANCA and DAMO-SSD organization they create countering
WMD proliferation decisions with insufficient time and inadequate information in a
changing environment (Murgado, 2013). The sample’s perceptions will be studied by
employing Simon’s TBR decision standard (Simon, 1961, 1978, 1985, 1997) for
countering WMD decision-making (Simon, 1961, 1985, 1997). A forte of qualitative
analyses is the ability to examine procedures by which incidents and affairs occur,
leading to an outcome (Yin, 2009). Thus, the foresee case study is appropriate for
examining an incident during standard setting, besides, the objective of the single case
study is to investigate how USANCA and DAMO-SSD coordination authority
association and decision-making method enables midlevel managers to counter WMD
decisions in a realistic location.
The study design should facilitate the exploration of how and why USANCA and
DAMO-SSD affiliation augments the DA’s supportive efforts with other DOD
departments, USG departments, and agencies to counter-WMD threats (Adamsky, 2014).
The study will provide the means to explore whether the exclusive counter WMD
understanding and proficiency provided by USANCA and DAMO-SSD partnership
create for DA, and the whole DOD an exceptional significant benefit for countering
WMD (Adamsky, 2014). Additionally, the study design will facilitate the empirical
study within an individual entity such as the particular knowledge and familiarity
essential for the USANCA and DAMO-SSD enterprise nominal and functioning issues
(Yin, 2009).
Research Questions
Del Campo et al. (2016), suggests that organization’s structure influence how
leaders make decisions during critical times. Likewise, Simon (1997), suggested that
organizations substructures create internal systems (verbal and nonverbal) that aids in
accomplishing tasks and simultaneously make critical decisions at their levels. The
proposed study utilizes Simon’s TBR (Simon, 1961, 1978, 1985), as the theoretical
framework to use as a decision model to examine countering WMD decision-making
within USANCA and DAMO-SSD enterprise under the DA and DOD collaboration
method. Following are the research questions for the study:
Q1. What are O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14 midlevel managers perceptions of the TBR
decision model on USANCA and DAMO-SSD enterprise decision-making procedures in
support of DA and DOD collaboration for countering WMD proliferation?
Q2. What O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14 midlevel managers observation of the function
of the TBR decision model for USANCA and DAMO-SSD decision making methods?
Q3. To what extent Simon’s TBR decision model would impact the enduring
capability of USANCA and DAMO-SSD, O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14 midlevel managers to
approach, remember and salvage distinctive countering WMD knowledge for complex
WMD proliferation problem decisions?
Significance of the Study
To effectively counter-WMD, DOD focuses its military capabilities and strategic
efforts on deterring, dissuading and defeating those states willing to use or threating to
use WMDs against the U.S. and allies (Adamsky, 2014; Bonds et al.., 2014). The Army
Secretary and Chief of Staff decision to reorganize USANCA and DAMO-SSD to gain
counter WMD unique knowledge and to take advantage of organizational operating
relationship require additional studies (Goodman, 2016). The research is necessary due
to the limited analysis on USANCA and DAMO-SSD decision-making methodology to
countering-WMD proliferation, nonproliferation and consequence management
(Goodman, 2016). The examination of the behavioral, organizational, and political
effects of a coordination authority relationship can highlight areas USANCA and
DAMO-SSD midlevel manager could apply to future decisions (Goodman, 2016; Siniver
& Lucas, 2016).
Moreover, the information acquired by the proposed study could increase the
scholarly literature on DA’s coordinating authority connections containing the structural
decision-making make-ups of USANCA and DAMO-SSD (Goodman, 2016). The
objective of the study will include the determination of how midlevel managers make
countering WMD decisions during limited time and information in an uncertain
environment.
Definition of Key Terms
The following definitions will aid with the understating of the study as DOD and
DA organizations mainly use these terms.
Coordination authority. Authority was given to a military commander or
individual that has the obligation of directing the accomplishments of specific
occupations, activities, missions shared by the armed forces of two or more military
departments. The commander or responsible individuals must call meetings to discuss
and collaborate with the forces of the same service, or two or more joint force
components or agencies (GAO, 2013).
Countering weapons of mass destruction (CWMD). Per the Military Strategy,
CWMD refers to actions “against actors of concern to prevent the development,
possession, proliferation, use, and effects of WMD, related expertise, materials,
technologies, and means of delivery” (DOD, 2014 p. 17).
General Schedule. Predominant pay scale in the United States civil service.
This pay scare includes most administrative personnel (professional, technical,
administrative, and clerical) positions (OPM, 2017).
Senior Leader. A Department of Defense General Officer or Flag Officer
(Military) or Senior Executive Service (Civilian) (DOD, 2014).
United States Army Nuclear and Combating Weapons of Mass Destruction
Agency (USANCA). Department of the Army operating agency which provides support
to DA’s strategic and operational demands with nuclear and countering weapons of mass
destruction (CWMD) expertise and analysis. (AR 10-16, 2008)
United States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM). One of the United
States combatants commands in DOD. Under Title 10 United States Code Section 161
(2016), a unified combatant command is a military command composed of forces from
two or more military departments (DOD, 2014).
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). The Military Strategy for Countering
WMD states that WMDs are chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons
capable of causing mass casualties, excluding the means of transporting or propelling the
weapons where such means is a separable and divisible part of the weapons (DOD,
2014).
Summary
This chapter explains the needed for the research on USANCA and DAMO-SSD
decision-making methods for countering WMDs (Bartholomees, 2010; Jentleson 2014;
Lotan, 2015) to which the RDT is principally applied in national security decision-
making (Adamsky, 2014; Jentleson 2015; Lotan, 2015). The chapter highlights the
proposed use of a single-case study to research USANCA and DAMO-SSD coordination
authority relationship, and midlevel managers make counter-WMD decisions in contrast
with Simon’s TBR decision-making process for resolving issues under the uncertain
environment (Simon, 1961, 1978, 1997). Understanding USANCA’s and DAMO-SSD’s
effort for improving its counter-WMD capabilities regarding Simon’s TBR will provide
extrapolations related to the USG midlevel managers CWMD experts decision-making
processes to deter within their limits extremist organizations from obtaining and
employing WMDs (Adamsky, 2014; Bartholomees, 2010; Jentleson 2014; Lotan, 2015).
The proposed study will include two distinct data sources: direct observations
notations and midlevel managers CWMD experts’ interviews. The data review will
center on the analysis of midlevel managers CWMD experts’ interview answers and the
evaluation of appropriate observational notations. The notations will explore midlevel
manager’s perception of employing Simon’s TBR decision model (Simon, 1961, 1997).
Therefore, since there is no academic research involving the countering WMD decision-
making methods of multifaceted organizations with a coordinating authority relationship
within DA, the outcome of this case study may offer a different perspective in the
relevance of Simon’s TBR and countering WMD decision-making methods and processes
(Adamsky, 2014; Bartholomees, 2010).
Chapter 2: Literature Review
Theoretical/Conceptual Framework
In order to completely comprehend the primary driver behind the decisions by the
managers at USANCA and DAMO-SSD, there is a need to dig deeper into the theoretical
framework behind their actions as well as the various steps in countering the proliferation
of the various weapons of mass destruction. The theoretical framework of choice is
Simon’s TBR (Theory of Bounded Rationality) which is useful in managing various
associated risks and making decisions on both large scale and small scale applications
(Simon, 1961; Simon 1972; Simon 1997). In Simon’s theory, there is a suggestion that
fundamental decisions are made in an environment that is ambiguous. The source of such
ambiguity may stem from inaccessible information or difficulty in the physical
environment, as well as limitations in resources, access, or time (Rizun & Taranenko,
2014; Simon 1961; Simon, 1997, Simon, 1972). Such a scenario is quite common in the
operations of the military, and therefore, Simon’s TBR may prove useful in connecting
the approach by the US army in countering the spread and usage of the weapons of mass
destruction.
The basic tenet of Simon’s theory of bounded rationality is the identification of
various triggers that both stimulate and hinder the development of soultions, as well as
the making of rational decisions by individuals and groups operating under a form of
constraint. Simon suggests that the premise of such action is in the identification of such
actions and deciphering the required actions in lieu of the available and absent resources
to aid in the development of a solution that is satisfying, acceptable, and suitable to the
given situation (Rizun & Taranenco, 2014; Simon, 1991; Simon 1972; Simon, 1985;
Simon 1997).
Simon’s theory of bounded rationality has the advantage of adaptability (Simon,
1972). In this regard, the approach outlined is applicable in various aspects such as in
business settings, in profit and not for profit organizations, in the military, and also in
governmental agencies. This spread and wide range of applicability means that the
approach is also moldable to fit into specific cases that may require specialized
approaches that require results and decision making under scenarios of extreme pressure
and limitations in terms of available resources and different bodies of authority (Simon,
1985; Rizun & Taranenco, 2014; Simon, 1991; Simon, 1997). However, in spite of these
advantages, Simon’s theory necessitates a number of requirements and considerations of
the specific environment to ensure there is sufficient compatibility with the approach
(Rizun & Taranenco, 2014).
Theoretical considerations for the Theory of Bounded Reality.
Functional limitation of the brain in handling data. A first consideration is the
functional limitation of the human brain in relation to data. This is in lieu of the human
capacity to store, process, and retrieve data, as well as their capacity to make use of such
data to make rational decisions (Simon, 1972; Simon, 1985; Simon, 1991). The limitation
of the human brain in processing data and information to generate meaningful results
directly impacts the ability of the individual to make rational decisions. This correlation
between the making of rational decisions and the capacity of the human brain presents a
challenge to the implementation of Simon’s Theory of Bounded reality (Simon, 1972;
Simon, 1985; Stanczyk, Foerstl, Busse, & Blome, 2015).
Limitation in the ability to visualize all options. The intellectual capacity of the
human mind is dependent on the ability of the individual to process data (Morselli, 2015;
Simon, 1972, Simon, 1991). Such processing of data bears various factors, among them
being the ability and speed of storing and accessing such data. In addition, the process of
receiving and manipulating the information from an external source and processing the
same to relate it to available knowledge in order to develop reasoning and understanding
is vital to the process as well (Morselli, 2015; Stanczyk, Foerstl, Busse, & Blome, 2015).
Once such information is processed, the brain requires to deliver meaningful results to the
problems at hand. Among the stages of getting solutions involves the visualization of the
available and feasible options towards accessing the required solution (Morselli, 2015;
Stanczyk, Foerstl, Busse, & Blome, 2015).
The intellectual limitations of the human mind play a vital role in the absence of
the ability of the human to visualize possible answers to a given problem (Morselli, 2015;
Stanczyk, Foerstl, Busse, & Blome, 2015). In this regard, this limitation in the number of
possibilities that the human brain can process simultaneously about a given problem
provides a hindrance to the required efficiency in problem solving. The absence of the
ability for infinite visualizations, therefore, encumbers the human from considering all
available, relevant and feasible alternatives to solving the problem at hand (Simon, 1985;
Morselli, 2015; Stanczyk, Foerstl, Busse, & Blome, 2015). The consideration of this
limitation is imperative in deciding the effectiveness of the theory of bounded rationality
and its various applications (Simon, 1972; Simon, 1985; Simon, 1991; Stanczyk, Foerstl,
Busse, & Blome, 2015; Morselli, 2015)
Limited accessibility to resources. A third consideration when deliberating on the
applicability of the theoretical applicability of the various theories of bounded rationality
is the issue of limited resource availability (Stanczyk, Foerstl, Busse, & Blome, 2015). As
an economic, psychological, and social issue, the absence of infinite resources is a
limitation to the access to numerous opportunities. In a similar fashion, limited access to
the required resources is a binding factor to the applicability of the theory of bounded
rationality (Simon, 1991; Simon, 1972). In the current context, such limitation refers to
limitations in evidence, knowledge, and time resources that aid in decision making and
follow up activities (Morselli, 2015; Stanczyk, Foerstl, Busse, & Blome, 2015; Simon,
1972).
Such limited access to the required resources is an impediment to the application
of the theory of bounded rationality. In essence, therefore, such limitations are among the
binding factors espoused by the theorem (Simon, 1991; Simon, 1972; Simon, 1985).
Therefore, such limitations of access to resources of knowledge, evidence, and time
among others, prevent rational decision making and follow up actions that aim to solve
specific problems facing the individuals (Stanczyk, Foerstl, Busse, & Blome, 2015;
Rizun & Taranenco, 2014; Morselli, 2015).
In a theoretically perfect scenario where information is completely accessible,
there would be sufficient evidence, knowledge and time. These resources would enable
the individual to perform an analysis of the situation in an effective manner. This would,
in effect, lead to better information that would guide the development of a relevant and
effective solution to the existing problem. Such information, therefore, aids in the rational
reasoning process that results in better decision making (Morselli, 2015; Stanczyk,
Foerstl, Busse, & Blome, 2015; Rizun & Taranenco, 2014). Contrariwise, however, such
a scenario does not suffice, and the limited accessibility to resources impedes the
efficiency of rationality and the effectiveness of reasoning among various individuals
(Stanczyk, Foerstl, Busse, & Blome, 2015).
The theory of bounded rationality
The theory of bounded rationality is a theorem developed by Herbert Alexander
Simon on the process of decision making and various factors that impend the rationality
of decisions by individuals (Simon, 1972; Gigerenzer, 2001; Gigerenzer & Goldstein,
2017). Theories regarding the concept of bounded rationality have emerged over the
years after Simon’s initial offering. As such, there are several variations of the concept of
bounded rationality. The original concept of hurdles in decision making, however, has
remained the same (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2017; Gigerenzer G. , 2001) . The alternative
theories and resulting models serve to slightly tweak some ideas in a bid to ensure the
model suits a given problem, industry, or profession. This section seeks to explain the
fundamentals of the theory and its derivative models as well as provide information on
the usage of the theory as pertains to this paper.
The original concept of bounded rationality was developed by Herbert Simon,
who explained that the ratioanlity of various individuals involved in decision making is
limited by various factors. Among the original limiting factors developed by Simon
includes the cognitive limitations of the human mind, availability of time, and the
manipulability of the decisions made (Simon, 1972; Simon, 1991; Simon, 1985). In
Simon’s view (1972), the decision makers, being exposed to multiple social and econmic
factors in addition to those introduced in the theorem, make decisions that satisfy the
problem, rather than those that optimally address the concerns at hand (Simon, 1972;
Simon, 1991; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2017). In this regard, therefore, human beings will
usually seek something that is acceptable or good enough, while it may not neceessarily
be the optimal alternaive.
Simon proposed that the concepts behind the theory of bounded rationality are
applicable in a varying array of uses and scenarios. Key among the uses include the
application in the lives of individuals and also in formal group settings (Simon, 1972;
Simon, 1985; Simon, 1991; Stanczyk, Foerstl, Busse, & Blome, 2015; Rizun &
Taranenco, 2014; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2017). A major development on the side of
Simon’s approach was the reduction of a model that was entirely mathematical. Simon’s
apporach used the concepts of socilogy and human behavior to assess the possible
scenarios and, therefore, develop meaningful solutions (Johnson, 1966; Simon, 1972;
Simon, 1991).
The alternative approach by Simon and the reduction of the dependance on
mathematical modelling in his theory of bounded rationality allowed for a better and
closer approach to understanding human behavior (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2017;
Simon, 1991). In this regard, since human behavior is the core pillar of the theory of
bounded rationality, it is imperative that the theorem and subsequent models have a clear
understanding of human behavior (Simon, 1972; Simon 1985; Simon, 1991; Gigerenzer
G. , 2001). Therefore, the model and theory of bounded ratioanlity are based on human
behavior, the same concepts that Simon tries to explain with the theory (Gigerenzer G. ,
2001; Rizun & Taranenco, 2014). This focus on human behavior is seen as a strong factor
for the success of the theory of bounded rationality.
A concept developed by Simon within the development of the thereom of
bounded rationality is the idea of the decision making entities acting as (Simon, 1972;
Simon, 1985; Simon, 1991). Simon developed this concept to explain a scenario he
observed in human beings in the process of making various decisions. In this case, the
decision makers, in seeking a solution to the problem at hand, were observed to seek for a
satisfactory solution rather than an optimal one (Simon, 1972; Simon, 1985; Simon,
1991; Stanczyk, Foerstl, Busse, & Blome, 2015). The concept of satisfiers came about
after the realization that the human beings were in essence looking for solutions that were
satisfactory, and those that would suffice in the current situation the decision maker was
facing at that point in time.
According to Simon, the human mind makes use of the known structures in the
environment of operation to delimit and compensate for the unknown (Simon, 1991;
Simon, 1972; Johnson, 1966). This implies that the mind of the decision maker, in an
attempt to stabilize the scenario, will act in a manner where the actions and thought
processes will emulate the known structures and processes to find a viable solution to the
problem at hand. Simon further added that such behavior, including the search for a
viable solution rather than an optimal one, is dependent on the interaction between the
known environmental structures and the cognitive limitations of the human mind (Simon,
1972; Simon, 1991).
To illustrate this concept, Simon developed an analogy of the decision making
process where he compared it to a pair of scissors. He explained that one of the blades
would be viewed as the cognitive limitations of the human mind, while the other is
viewed as the environmental structures that the particular individual is aware of. The
interaction of the two blades on a scissor replicate the compensation done by individuals
in terms of the limited access to various resources. Such compensation takes place
through the exploitation of the known environmental structures to regulate and create a
sense of regularity and stability (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2003; Simon, 1991; Gigerenzer G.
, 2001)
While most theories directly assume rationality of the human mind and
characteristics, Simon’s theory of bounded rationality does not. In this case, Simon, while
agreeing with common rationality, places a limit to the rationality of humans. This is in
opposition to most other theories in business, sociology, philosophy, and economics,
where the assumption is above average rationality without limits (Gigerenzer &
Goldstein, 2017; Simon, 1972; Simon, 1991; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2003). In Simon’s
theory of bounded rationality, he presents a scenario where the condition of a perfect
scenario is hard to come by.
Simon’s theory of bounded rationality presents a case where perfectly rational
decisions and scenarios are not possible. In this regard, the theory provides various
factors that limit, or bind, the decision making process, thus making a perfect case not
practically feasible (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2003; Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2017; Simon,
1972). Key among these factors as discussed earlier, include the intractability of
decisions by the human mind, the finite cognitive, storage, and computational capabilities
of the human brain, and limitations in terms of access to the required resources for
making and following up on such decisions (Simon, 1972; Simon, 1991; Morselli, 2015;
Stanczyk, Foerstl, Busse, & Blome, 2015; Rizun & Taranenco, 2014).
Therefore, the theory of bounded rationality as developed by Herbert A. Simon
provides a view into the decision making process for individuals. In this case, the
prevailing concept is that of assumed rationality among the decision making entities
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2017; Simon, 1972; Simon, 1991). In addition, Simon identifies
various factors that act as limiting binders to the rationality of individuals involved in
decision making. Key among these are the limitation of access to the required resources
and the cognitive limitation of the human brain.
Individual versus organizational rationality
Up to this point, the concept of bounded rationality has been confined to the
thought process and limitations of individuals. However, according to March and Simon
(1993), there are similar behavioral characteristics in the organizational decision making
process as observed in the decision making process for individuals. Consequently, it is
important to understand the defining similarities and differences between the decision
making process of individuals and organizations, as well as the various binding factors
within each segment.
In determining the comparison between the organizational and individual decision
making processes and rationality, a sound starting point would be the discussion between
Herbert Alexander Simon and Mie Augier. In her follow up essay after their discussion,
Augier states that the ideas and philosophies developed by Simon are invaluable to the
development of a concrete theoretical base for the social sciences (Augier, 2001) . Augier
goes on to recommend the collaborative work by Simon and March (1993) as a basis for
gaining an understanding of the corporate version of the theory of bounded rationality. In
making a comparison, therefore, ideas from the various works by Simon and other
authors are compared for congruity.
Decision making in large organizations is vital to the efficiency of their
operations. As such, most organizations will seek ways to streamline the process of
decision making in order to reduce inefficiencies. Decision making in large corporates
and other similar organizations follows a more complex approach than that of the
individual user (Foss & Weber, 2016) . As such, rational decision making approaches are
integral and vital to the success of any organization. There are numerous constraints to
making rational decisions within the organizational setting, and while some are similar to
those for individuals, there are some changes to the process as well as the limitations
observed.
In an organizational setting, and in the context of decision making, there are
various constraints to the decision making process that follows the principles of
rationality (Simon, 1972; Gigerenzer & Selten, 2003). The primary constraints for this
category of rational decision making include; the concept of satisficing – where the
managers will more often than not pick the first alternative (Simon, 1972; Simon, 1991,
Gigerenzer G. , 2001). Such an alternative will usually meet the basic requirements and
will be satisfactory. However, such an option is rarely the most efficient and in the case
of the organizational decision making process, it would be an inefficient approach
(Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2017; Foss & Weber, 2016; Gigerenzer G. , 2001).
A second constraint to the decision making process in an organizational setting is
the recognition that the conceptual ideology of the world from a management perspective
is highly simplified. Since decision making in most organizations is done in a formal
setting, there is a lot of dependence on theoretical approaches, theories, and models. For
such approaches to work, there has to be a simplification of the real world problems so as
to allow the theries to work and make sense. In addition, a lot of assumptions are made to
accommodate theoretcal inefficiencies in the development of various decision making
models. As such, the working of the models on paper may significantly differ from actual
workings on the ground. The realization of such simplification by the managers is a
constraint to the efficient operations through the limitation of rationality in the decision
making process of the organization.
A third constraint in the organizational process of decision making is the fact that
most managers are comfortable making decisions without evaluating the alternatives. In
this case,
The limits (bounds) of rationality theories
Risk and uncertainty
According to Cigar (2014), it is common practice for military policymakers to
revert back to the established doctrine particularly when they find themselves in
uncharted territories that present high risks and uncertainties. While studying the role of
Deterrence, paradigm and operational culture in countering WMDA, Cigar (2014) makes
significant assertions on the ‘war trigger’ effect of decision making uncertainty. He
argues that when policymakers are confronted with ambiguous situations and have
limited time and information, they have a tendency to be defensive of the pre-existing
theoretical paradigms that constitute an established system of decision making. Cigar
(2014) further acknowledges the impossibility dilemma presented to decision makers
stating that it is difficult for them to discard an established paradigm or set of operational
theories (pp.299-300). This perspective is shared by Debs and Monteiro (2014) who
argues that uncertainties have a twofold effect. In the first instance, it presents the
possibility of a state undertaking covert militarization with the objective of realizing a
rapid power shift. Secondly, it also grants other states a rationalized foundation for
launching preventive attacks notwithstanding the absence of unambiguous evidence
suggesting an actual militarization strategy (Chen, 2013). Furthermore, Debs and
Monteiro (2014) posit that the pursuit of a power shift simply on ‘afait accompli’ basis
creates an atmosphere of uncertainty which retrospectively provides a rational ground for
misconceived preventive strikes (p.2). Therefore due to the enormous risk presented by
uncertainty; innocent targets may be attacked for deterrence purposes. Their argument
that endogenous power shifts have the potential to trigger war except under realistic
situations of uncertainty pertaining to military investment decisions of another nation
could have a certain degree of legitimacy (p.2) . Debs and Monteiro (2014) affirms this
position, arguing that unlike endogenous power shifts that occur best under absolute
uncertainty, exogenous power shifts are characterized by the presence of perfect
information, and hence requires absolute certainty. Mitzen and Schweller (2011) concurs
that most wars are triggered under circumstances of high uncertainty, but rather choses to
focus on the role of certainty, and more specifically, misplaced certainty as a common
source of conflict pathways that are primarily perceived to be depended on uncertainty.
These security pathways encompass security dilemmas and spirals. The co-authors argue
that although structural uncertainty acts as a rational trigger of conflicts, there is high
probability that these security dilemmas and spirals are embedded within the preccints of
proximate uncertainty. Therefore when faced with similar challenges, policymakers
surmount significant pressure. They conclude that both structural uncertainty and the
decision makers own misplaced certainty are to blame for most wars. The U.S invasion of
Iraq in 2003 is a classic example of how ‘misplaced certainty’ can lead to conflict. In this
case, the U.S top political and military decision makers were exuberantly confident that
the Iraq regime possessed Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD). Nonetheless, it turned
out that their “certain knowledge” was misplaced (Mitzen and Schweller, 2011). The co-
authors suggest that cases of misplaced certainty are prevalent in the political arena
especially given the uncertain and dynamic nature of the international politics.
Fisher and Biggar (2011) concur with Cigar (2014), that decision making during
war time is made under situations of uncertainty just like other organizational contexts
(p.700). Nonetheless, he asserts that this kind of decisions requires practical wisdom
especially in the evaluation of the impacts of military action. According to the co-authors
view, the coalition partners failed in this regard during the regime change campaign in
Libya as the military action was devoid of elaborate plans of dealing with the war
aftermath. Mitzen and Schweller (2011) emphasises that it’s the lack of information or
misinformation that compels rational states into misjudging the intention of other states,
thereby sparking an arms spiral (p.11). In the process, a genuine security seeking nation
could be misperceived as one pursuing an aggressive militarization agenda. Thus they
argued that these cases of mistaken identity are the most prevalent pathogenesis of global
wars. Zwald (2013) stresses the importance of mutual restraint in the face of proximate
uncertainty. He argues that restraint is a necessary precursor as it helps in the moderation
of cognitive biases that plays a critical role in the elimination of fundamental attribution
errors that trigger most wars. Therefore, policymakers will more often than not perceive
that their nemesis’s actions are primarily defensive rather than offensive. Zwald (2013)
posits that rather than triggering a security dilemma, uncertainty should be a catalyst for
rationality that should motivate policymaker’s into the establishment of self-protective
policies that do not deteriorate the security of others. In conclusion, Zwald (2013) argues
that the ‘irreducible uncertainty’ associated with a nuclear conflict and lack of adequate
information about the adversaries is poised to endure for long hence there is need for
flexible thinking on the part of policymakers.
Freedman (2013) posits that uncertainty and complexity theories underlie both
low intensity and high intensity warfare. These two theories have been widely used in the
study of conflicts including the Iraq wars. Political uncertainty has complicated the
capability of military and political strategist’s ability to predict with certainty, the
outcome of conflicts (Freedman, 2013). However, in the study of conflicts, more
emphasis is accorded to uncertainty rather than certainty, especially given that certainty is
regarded as the lack of uncertainty. This therefore implies that increase in certainty is
inversely proportional to uncertainty. Indeed numerous studies have focused on the effect
of uncertainty as opposed to certainty where realists posit that structural uncertainty has
the potential to trigger wars in the form of balance of power, arms race or more still,
mistaken preventive wars (Bradley, 2015). According to realists, wars are not always a
product of uncertainty even though it’s acknowledged that the uncertainty of power and
misinterpretation of intentions of others is a common trigger of conflicts. This is further
supported by the realist argument that most conflicts emerge from the boundedness of the
political leaders cognitive capacities. Nevertheless, it’s the rational policymaker’s
decisions that spark conflicts particularly when made under conditions of mistaken
certainty (Debs & Monteiro, 2014). Still, realists underscore the important role played by
uncertainty in sparking conflicts. Realists concur that conflicts are triggered under four
conditions (Altman,2015). First and foremost, states revert to anarchy to resolve their
disputes. The second reason is the spiral effect and the security dilemma, distributional
conflicts and structural uncertainty. Therefore structural uncertainty occurs due to the
inability to accurately assess an adversary’s military power, as it is dynamic. According
to realists, wars are triggered by both structural logics and other dynamics related to
interstate bargaining (Mitzen & Schweller, 2011). Subsequently, structural realists’
argument is that increased sophistication does increase the degree of uncertainty. This
perspective is shared with neoralists who hold the view that multipolar systems are highly
sophisticated and unstable as compared of bipolar systems. As such, the degree of
uncertainty is much higher in the former than the latter, thus increasing chances of
conflicts. According to Debs and Monteiro (2014) uncertainty can be defined as the
prediction of one state with regards to its adversarial relative military power and
intentions. Due to the increased complexity and dynamism of the international
environment, mistaken judgment over another’s intention and purpose may lead to war.
Still, offensive realists concur with this perspective arguing that the uncertainty regarding
an adversary’s intentions could be a major cause of wars, and in particular, the
uncertainty about another nation’s future intentions (Miller, 2013). Their argument is
premised on the logic that most indicators of intentions are inaccurate, dynamic and
ultimately unpredictable. Jones, Smith & Stone (2012) argue that lthough the structural
realist argument seems plausible, it may be evidently logical that nations will cease
militarization when there is perceived certainty about the other’s good intentions.
However, the reverse is true under uncertainty.
It’s uncertainty that brings about a security dilemma that can ultimately lead to
unintended and unpredictable actions (Chawla, Mangaliso, Knipes & Gauthier, 2012). In
equal measure, he argues that uncertainty can spark or restraint nations from engaging in
a conflict. Wars start due to perceived existential risk posed by the adversary about the
others actions. This is because intentions are complex and difficult to establish due to the
growing complexity of the international structure Atzili & Pearlman, 2012). On the
question of uncertainty as a cause of wars, structural realists grapple with the dilemma as
to what motivates rational policymakers to choose war especially under structural
uncertainty, and hence their absolute certainty concerning uncertain actions that drives
them into taking unrealistic political risks. This may be a legitimate cause to believe that
uncertainty and misinterpretation could trigger wars (Miller, 2013; Bromme & Goldman,
2014).
Incomplete information about alternatives
According to Michael (2012), bargaining theories underscore the fact that
uncertainty increases the potential for risk taking especially due to incomplete
information. Furthermore, he posists that they underscore the insufficiency of information
as a critical cause of war. As such, this redefines bounded rationality as permitting
contradicting predictions of the unknown possibilities inherent in the adversary’s motive
in divulging incomplete information (Mitzen & Schweller, 2011). The bargaining
theories discusses the impact of information insufficiency can hinder rational
policymakers from arriving at ex ante position that both sides would choose to explore
the risk of war rather than peace. This and other theories present structural uncertainty as
a primary trigger for interstate wars. The structural limitation of anarchy implies that the
states are unwilling to exchange factual information, and to decipher and differentiate
truth from heresy (Zwald, 2013). Considering the predominance of the structural and
bargaining theories of war, there is a general presumption that uncertainty escalates the
potential for global conflicts, whereas certainty increases the possibility for peace.
Nevertheless, uncertainty is largely attributed to the theories of security dilemma and
spiral wars (Bradley, 2015 ; Fisher & Biggar, 2011). Similar studies have insisted on the
significance of mistaken certainty in conflict generation. It is however important to note
that uncertainty is more likely to trigger conflict and war especially when it creates a
security dilemma. if there is a perceived offensive advantage and subsequently, the
misinterpretation of defense actions as offensive.
Therefore, uncertainty and structural certainty both increases probability of risk
taking even under circumstances of bounded rationality (Chen, 2013). Nonetheless, Chen
(2013) further appreciates the fact that war tends more toward irrationality rather than
rationality, and hence a combined tendency towards uncertainty. On other hand Mitzen
and Schweller R. L. (2011) opines that war uncertainty is triggered by the existence of
two counteracting wills which act together toward limitation of bounded rationality–
limited time, incomplete information and possible emotional instability can make
prediction of the future more uncertain. Subsequently, military strategy must be dynamic
and adaptable to the complex and rapidly changing global environment. Debs and
Monteiro (2014) acknowledges that there exists two information challenges particularly
during endogenous power shifts, firstly, whether one state has purposed to undertake a
militarization agenda and secondly, the arrangement of a specific weapons program that
is pursued by the state. The bounded rationalist perspective is that covert military buildup
serves as an ideal example on how militarization can lead to war (Fisher & Biggar, 2011).
Assuming Complexity
The complexity theory has emerged as an important aspect in the explanation of
the complexity and the extremely intricate nature of modern warfare (Cioffi-Revilla &
Romero, 2009). Presumption of complexity of warfare especially by the Command and
Control Research Program (CCRP) helps decision makers in the rationalization of their
policy decisions. It provides a viable platform for computer modeling and simulation that
provides critical predictions, simulations and information on possible human behavior
during warfare. Still, the complexity theory helps in dealing with possible divergent
scenarios and hence the need for extensive analysis of available facts (Mountcastle,
(2016). Thus the importance of evaluating uncertainty and complexity involved in
CWMD is gaining prominence among both military and political decision makers.
Therefore, there is need for in-depth evaluation of both uncertainty and complexity
pattern that is evident from the conduct of the adversary, and hence any judgment must
be based on factual information a, and s well as testable insights (Altman, 2015; Miller,
2013). It’s only this that could then eventually result to a specified course of action and
validation of the established doctrine against the changing environment. Modeling of
complex scenarios helps policy makers make prediction notwithstanding the evident
uncertainty based on complexity theory (Atzili & Pearlman, 2012).
The mantra of presumption of complexity in military strategies can be largely
mistaken. There is an assumption that the environment within which the military operates
increases in complexity over time (Warner, 1988; Martin, 2011). Thus the environmental
complexity today exceeds that of the past eras. It’s this assertion that is often used as a
justification for military restructuring. However, this presumption has been linked to a
series of past strategic and operational mishaps by the U.S Army. The presumption of the
complexity of war, and especially the CWMD war where terrorists are presumed to be
highly intelligent and strategic in their quest for new discoveries has compelled the U.S
Army to devise new methods of defining CWMD (Miller, 2013; Atzili & Pearlman,
2012). As a result, new terms such as full spectrum operations and asymmetric warfare
have emerged. This paradigm shift in the U.S Army’s strategic focus in CWMD has
significantly altered the U.S military doctrine as was evident by the introduction of Field
manual 3-24 that redefined the strategies of countering WMD particularly based on the
assumption of complexity and the intricate nature of CWMD and counterinsurgency
operations (Jones, Smith, & Stone, 2012). Nevertheless, there is sufficient ground for
acknowledging the critical role of complexity in the CWMD strategy formulation.
Complexity is a multi-disciplinary concept that is used in defining systemically dynamic
and adaptive environments that ignores the role of causal relationship (Warner, 1988;
Martin, 2011). The global security environment is dynamic and unpredictable as it
includes high risks, evolving threats and an exceedingly high degree of uncertainty. Some
of these dynamics that shape the global arena includes global terrorism, cyber-attack and
proliferation of WMD as well as increased innovation in transformative military
technologies that can be used by non-state actors (Daulton & Shavce, 2014).
Risk Management
Risk management is a critical facet of the U.S military planning, operations and
policy formulation. In the CWMD, risk minimization and mitigation is central toward
achievement of the CWMD objectives (Forkiotis, & Dawkins, 2002). In this program, the
U.S military undertakes risk management in diverse ways. First and foremost, risks are
mitigated through the improvement of internal controls which averts risks that could
emanate from lack of cooperation especially on the part of the CTR target nations
(Daulton & Shavce, 2014). Since the United States cooperates with other nations in
combating WMD through the CTR defense project, the risk of failure of such projects
does not squarely lie within the control of the U.s army. The defense department cannot
totally mitigate all risks related to the cooperating nation. Subsequently, DOD regularly
improves its internal controls even though this precludes CTR project reviews as it lacks
systems for assessing projects for purposes of applying the lessons learned in similar
future undertakings (Adaskova, Chuguryan & Kucharcik, 2013). A case example is that
of the Soviet Union where the U.S Defense Department through the Cooperative Threat
Reduction (CTR) initiative disbursed $5 billion to fund a program for secure elimination
of Russia’s WMD to mitigate risks related to nuclear proliferation (Long Si, 2017). The
U.S government, through the CTR program is focused on eliminating the risk of WMD
proliferation through various activities such as destruction of nuclear missiles,
construction of nuclear storage facilities, destruction of chemical weapons, safe
elimination of biological pathogens as well as the employment of retired weapon’s
scientists (Miller, 2013).
The department of defense has recently embarked on the enhancement of its risk
management and internal controls especially over its CWMD initiative. Nevertheless, it
still encounters numerous challenges evident from the past failure of some of its CTR
programs (Forkiotis, & Dawkins, 2002). The failure of two consecutive CWMD
initiatives, particularly in former Soviet necessitated a shift to the current structured
approach in managing CTR project risks. This approach has been instrumental in risk
management and mitigation. In spite of these risk management strategies through a
change in management approaches, CTR risks cannot be completely eliminated (Daulton
& Shavce, 2014).
The CTR program plays a pivotal role in the elimination of threats and risks
related to nuclear proliferation which ensures that fissile material does not land in the
hands of irrational non-state actors. However, the Unite States is rationally bounded just
as the individual policy makers (Simon, 1991). This is because both state and none state
actors make strategic decisions that satisfy their self-interests. These state actors are
bounded rationally even though they have abundant resources while none state actors are
somewhat resource dependent and always aim at protecting and preserving their
individual and organizational reputation (Schiliró, D. (2012). These actors exhibit a
syndrome referred to as intended rationality which depicts a tendency toward aversion as
opposed to risk taking since they have to content with multiple stakeholders within and
without who have strong attachment to specify values and symbols (Adaskova,
Chuguryan & Kucharcik, 2013). According Long Si (2017) DOD developed three
component instructive models that provide a background for the management of risks
involved in the elimination of WMD through its counterterrorism strategy. These are risk,
vulnerability and criticality assessment. The DOD has devised new approaches to
managing risks posed by WMD which includes evaluation and mitigation of potential
risks linked to CTR projects (Warner, 1988; Martin, 2011). Towards accomplishing this
goal, the U.S military designates a single manager to assume the responsibility of
balancing CTR program requirements and possible risks (Jones, Smith, & Stone, 2012).
Secondly, the CTR program is multi-phased where each of the three phases requires
approval to proceed to the next level. Approval levels help policy makers determine
whether or not the project is on cause toward achievement of its objectives prior to
further disbursement of funds (Long Si, 2017). Thirdly, DOD uses periodic stakeholder
forums to assess and minimize various CTR program related risks. As a result,
stakeholders in the CWMD are informed on diverse project risks (Atzili & Pearlman,
2012). DOD’s middle level management handling the CTR projects are mandated to
institute risk mitigation strategies.
Risk assessment is a critical component of the operations of the U.S Army. The
Army Commanders ensure that risk management is used in the identification and
mitigation of risks related to potential hazards that can inadvertendly cause harm, death
or unanticipated collateral damage (Schiliró, D. (2012). CBRN and other WMD hazards
requires thorough risk analysis and planning prior to conducting the operation. The
CBRNE Special Force takes an integrated risk management approach that readies the
force for the most intricate tactical operations of countering weapons of mass destruction
(Forkiotis, & Dawkins, 2002). Prior to the iniation of counter-WMD operations, the
CBRNE Special Forces Command ensures that all the sites are secured and free from any
type of hazards (Adaskova, Chuguryan & Kucharcik, 2013). The team conducts a risk
assessment at the WMD sites. This done by the technical and BCT teams that ensure
maximum protection prior to the operation (Schiliró, D. (2012).
Risk management requires close coordination with the coordinating authoriy.
Therefore risk evaluation and analysis must be conducted in coordinatioin with DoD
which outlines the potential risks and possible worst caes scenario (Warner, 1988;
Martin, 2011). Still, risk assesment and risk management decisions must be made by
CBRN and EOD technical teams for purposes of protecting CBRNE command units from
potential dangers posed by conducting an operation within a WMD high risk environment
(Miller, 2013). This risks includes the probability of encounters with CBRNE agents
whose concentrations surpasses the capacity of Individual Protective Equipment (IPE),
through adverse consequences of munitions, location and high contamination risks (Atzili
& Pearlman, 2012).
Bounded rationality versus irrationality
According to Rusinekmn (2014) irrationality of a state can be determined from
not only the destructiveness of its behavior, but specifically through genocide. This
irrational tendency stems from a belief that certain criminal actions are justified, and
hence rational. This state of irrationality with a reign of terror and fear then becomes a
dogmatic national ideology, for nations that seek after global domination (Lewis, Howes,
& Singh, 2014). As such, irrationality is embedded within the state’s own pathological
political ideology. Thus genocide is a clear indicator of the underlying irrationality within
the nation’s sovereignty and depicts the potential for greater genocide (Rusinekmn,
2014). Based on this argument, it would appear that Simon’s perspective that human
beings are rationally bounded only served to introduce a possible dichotomous
interpretation of rationality in the moral context .
In his theory of bounded rationality, Simon claims that there exists no significant
disparity between the cognitive capability of a criminal and an upright law abiding citizen
(Rusinekmn, 2014). Based on this argument, it would suffice that the ruthless individuals
may not necessarily be irrational beings, but rather normal people whose decisions are
impacted by the limitations of their own bounded rationality and a siege mentality.
Rusinekmn (2014) further argues that irrationality results from an individual’s inability to
effectually channel own aggressiveness inculcated during childhood and varies in degree
from one person to another. The increase in the number of irrational people corresponds
to the global population growth ((Lewis, Howes, & Singh, 2014). While conventional
warfare takes a colossal amount of resources, it only takes one individual to detonate a
nuclear bomb. This trend is worrisome as it points to a corresponding increase in
probability that an irrational person will finally acquire a WMD(Rusinekmn, 2014).
In support of the argument of the existence of irrational states, Fox and DeLateur
(2014) opines that rational states may inadvertently choose to deliberately manifest
irrationality for strategic deterrence, which might be misinterpreted as a rational
behavior. Similarly, leaders may opt to portray themselves as slightly irrational with the
objective of gaining political leverage when faced with a looming conflict or war. Lewis,
Howes & Singh, (2014) however maintain that irrationality or psychological biasness in
decision making emerge from complex cognitive stressors that each conflict situation
portends. Still, decision making rationality of individuals may be impaired by personality
traits, insufficient information and a limited timeframe (Dokos, 2014; Roberts, 2009).
Still, state actors may panic when their leadership is threatened by terrorist groups. This
may lead to anxiety and pressure which could eventually trigger irrational decision
making. Additionally, a fractured military outfit could exploit an existing leadership
loophole by overstepping the national leadership by launching WMD attack against the
United States, its interests and its allies (Zwald, 2013). Therefore, although political
leaders and state policy makers may be rational, diverse cognitive biases and external
factors could increase the chances of misperception and hence depiction of behavioral
irrationality (Schiliró, 2012). More specifically, the use of deterrence underlies the
cognitive theory which presumes a particular cognitive state on the part of the adversary.
Due to cognitive limitations and other external influencers, the target nation’s
leadership may fail to acknowledge the seriousness posed by a particular threat (Dokos,
2014; Roberts, 2009). Still, there is always a presumption that the leadership could be
suffering from mental instability or incapacitation and hence they could be relying on an
irrational decision making approach (Freedman, 2013). A case example is that of former
U.S presidents Woodrow Wilson, and later Ronald Reagan who needed external decision
making help. It’s also documented that Hitler and Mao had problems with drug addiction.
According to declassified State Department documents, Park Chung, the former South
Korean president was an alcoholic(Zwald, 2013). The unpredictability and erratic nature
of such leaders could pose a great risk especially if they have WMD. Such leaders with
high latitude toward irrationality and misperceived certainties that could hinder the
success of deterrence as a CWMD strategy.
According to the theory of boundended rationality, decision making is perceived
as bounded when it suffers from information ambiguity or lack of it (Cioffi-Revilla, &
Romero, 2009). This information shortfall originates from the human inability to
understand all the plausible alternatives, situational uncertainties and the incapacity to
establish potential consequences. Most importantly, determining bounded rationality
based on two critical factors as posited by Simon namely satisficing searching is a
complex endeavor for decision makers Rusinekmn (2014). Based on these arguments,
President Bush’s decree that WMD be eliminated from Saddam’s regime could have been
considered as a bounded rational decision rather than as an irrational decision. According
to (Spohn, 2002), this could be considered as a flawed policy decision especially given
that the U.S spent colossal resources on a futile endeavor as Iraq lacked weapons of mass
destruction (Rusinekmn, 2014). The decision to invade Iraq in search of weapons of mass
destruction could have been the reason Iran and North Korea advanced their nuclear
programs. In this case, the American strategy of deterrence failed to realize its primary
objective (Rusinekmn, 2014). The Bush Administration’s decision to invade Iraq can thus
be perceived to have been non-rational as its primary goals of stopping Iraq from
developing and proliferating WMD was flawed given that there was no WMD in Iraq
(Lewis, Howes, & Singh, 2014).The American policy makers failed to optimally use the
available alternatives that could have led to the invasion decision. The irrationality of the
decision to attack Iraq for purposes of eliminating weapons of mass destruction cannot be
overstated (Tsang, 2008). Still, the Iraq invasion decision can be perceived as a rational
decision that failed due to the bounded nature of the decision makers. Therefore, it may
be that Bush’s foreign policy advisors were simply bounded in their rationality as the
intelligence information that largely influenced the decision was not founded on credible
evidence (Rusinekmn, 2014). The scarcity of information regarding the situation could
have been the primary limiting factor in their rationality. Other scholars believe that the
Bush administration intentionally bounded its policy makers by filtering the flow of
information hence ensuring that top policy makers had limited information (Rusinekmn,
2014)The decision can be termed to have been largely non-rational rather than irrational
since the Bush administration capability to make a rational decision was bounded by lack
of information and hence failure to make rational judgment on the situation (Lewis,
Howes, & Singh, 2014).
Bounded Rationality and Approaches to Countering WMD
The U.S Department of Defense (DOD) instituted a new CWMD strategic
framework in 2014 which comprised of four objectives of CWMD program(Kuznetsov,
2014.. The overall principle for the U.S Government is to secure the global environment
while rallying allies and partners in countering WMD before their use by rogue regimes,
failed regimes or non-state actors. Countering Biological weapons of Mass Destruction
(CBWMD) Threats (UDUM, 2013): The rapid rate of technological advancement and
globalization continues to increase the uncertainty and risks associated with the future
WMD, and especially the future threat of biological weapons. Modern bioengineering has
relaxed the requirements for genetic engineering thereby allowing non-state actors access
to biological weapons or agents needed to develop new pathogens (Kuznetsov, 2014). A
case example is where modern bioengineering technology was used to add interleuk-4, to
a smallpox pathogen thereby generating a new pathogen. As a result, the newly created
pathogen killed all the animals that had been vaccinated against smallpox (UDUM, Ş.
(2013).). The rapid technological advancement that has lowered the cost of biotechnology
is largely to blame for the increased uncertainty and risk linked to future biological
threats. There is also a possibility that the rapid technological advancement may result to
a complex combination of different threats. In the wake of the rapidly changing threat
posed by WMD, the U.S Army faces enormous challenges on how to deal with these
emerging threats where a single weapon could comprise different chemical and biological
weapons (Kuznetsov, 2014). There is a significant challenge of countering the
unspecified effects of these combined weapons thereby complicating the future efforts of
dealing with CBRN threats. The U.S Army has a developed an institutional operational
frameworks that will be used in confronting the current and future CBRN threats.
There is need for a paradigm shift in the CWMD strategies currently employed by
the U.S Army to incorporate four strategic pillars namely strategic deterrence,
nonproliferation, counter-proliferation and similar plausible defense initiatives (Kaufman,
E., & Hassassian, 2014). The non-proliferation includes a joint operation that involves
cooperation with other states and other counter-measures such as interdiction of WMD.
The U.S Army is also employing a WMD reduction strategy where it is engaged in
reduction cooperation that encompasses safe destruction and disposal of WMD. The
United States Army is also employing a counter-proliferation strategy through which it
cooperates with other likeminded nations in conducting WMD offensive operations, and
similar WMD focused defense operations as well as cooperation in incident
management(Kuznetsov, 2014). The U.S Army CWMD strategies based on the new
nuclear triad which has been modified to incorporate non-proliferation. The U.S Army is
also implementing the nuclear-weapons strategy aimed at achieving its nonproliferation
agenda. The U.S Army’ CWMD strategy should underscore strategic deterrence as the
major WMD counter-strategy. Another approach employed by the U.S Army is the use of
regional cooperation where partner states’ CWMD programs are funded by the United
States (Kaufman, E., & Hassassian, 2014). Nonetheless, strategic deterrence should be
jointly pursued with CWMD strategy to increase the possibility of success. Still, the
CWMD strategy should incorporate the overarching principle behind America’s nuclear
arsenal. This can be jointly used alongside global precision strikes and the use of a
national missile defense system According to Payne (2015) the national strategy should
aim at countering nation-state WMD and CBRN risks.
The U.S Army also works to eliminate WMD through interdiction, even though
this strategy needs re-evaluation to ascertain its efficacy in meeting the CWMD
objectives (Kuznetsov, 2014). There hasn’t been much success in the use of interdiction
ever since the interception of a German vessel headed toward Libya with nuclear
centrifuge parts. Interdiction has failed partly due to lack of transparency and clear
authorities. The U.S Army uses both ground and maritime joint operations to detect and
interdict nuclear materials (Kuznetsov, 2014). The military uses obtrusive scanners and
high precision monitors for detection of chemical or biological materials. Challenges
abound specifically in the use of interdiction as a counter-WMD approach since it tends
to overlook sensitive global issues that could promote proliferation of nuclear weapons.
Another important approach employed by the U.S military is targeting failing states for
safe elimination of WMD. By targeting the failing regimes, the Army is able to eliminate
CBRN hazards that could easily land in the hands of non-state actors (Kaufman, E., &
Hassassian, 2014).
Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction (CWMD)
In today’s globalized environment, the effort directed toward countering WMD is
hindered due to the increasing complexity of the international environment.Subsequently,
the risk of both state and non-state actors acquiring CBRN capabilities has never been as
real (Kuznetsov, 2014). Enemies of the United States are devising diverse attack
strategies that include the use of bio-engineering to develop pathogens and non-
conventional agents. Therefore the U.S Government and Army employ different
approaches in countering WMD. The U.S Army’s CWMD strategy focuses on three areas
referred to as lines of effort (LOE), and two DOD and U.S Army focused approaches to
achieve its CWMD objectives. The first LOE employed by the U.S army is acquisition
prevention which primarily aims at stopping the acquisition of CWMD (Payne, 2015).
This is accomplished through interdiction. The objective of the second LOE is threat and
risk reduction and containment of the existing WMD, while the last LOE is incidence
response which focuses on mitigation of WMD attacks UDUM, Ş. (2013). The U.S DoD
has delegated the CWMD task to the U.S Army’s Total Force, which relies on the three
LOEs to achieve the CWMD priority objectives. Although the enormity of the
consequences of attacking the United States with WMD cannot be overstated, the matter
will be complicated if it comes from non-states actors like Al-Qaida who operate within a
global network(Payne, 2015). However, given the existing mismatch of interests and
political ideology, the possibility of WMD attack cannot be ignored. The existence of
irrational leaders, rogue and failed states notwithstanding the previously failed deterrence
strategy, evidently suggests the great risk of a possible nuclear attack. Still, the
admittance of the U.S Army that there exist CBRN risks, and especially chemical and
radiological weapons. Given that the U.S Army currently prioritizes biological and
nuclear threats, the Army Total Force’s CWMD efforts may be jeopardized due to high
possibilities of encountering a chemical or radiological threat (Kuznetsov, 2014).
In 2014, the DoD redefined WMD to now include chemical and radiological
weapons. This now tasks the Army’s Total Force to develop counter-strategies of dealing
with similar threats (UDUM, 2013). Urgently, the United States army conducts CWMD
operations that cut across the conventional forces. As part of a global CWMD campaign,
the U.S and coalition partners conducted operations in Libya and Syria in 2011.
Meanwhile, the U.S is also using deterrence against North Korea. In 2014, DoD
developed a multifaceted CWMD approach which incorporated the whole government
approach(Kaufman, E., & Hassassian, 2014).. The U.S Joint Force 2020, is charged with
conducting global CWMD operations that leverages on the full force of the U.S
government units. The CWMD mission is nolonger confined to the Army’s Total Force
as it now incorporates all the conventional forces.
The current CWMD strategy applies to diverse brigade combat teams (BCT). The
2nd Infantry Division for example, conducted a major mock operation as preparation for
the elimination of North Korea’s weapons of mass destruction in the event that the
regime failed (UDUM, 2013).. On the other hand, the 82nd Airborne Division is charged
with the global mandate of countering WMD. Unlike the 2nd Infantry Division, 82nd AD
is charged with a broader mandate and hence a complex operating environment while
confronting different global adversaries. A range of other military Divisions and U.S
regional forces are also prepared to undertake CWMD tactical operations. Diverse U.S
Government agencies are involved in the CWMD operations(Kuznetsov, 2014).
The 20th CBRNE Command is a critical unit of the U.S Army. It evolved from
the 75th Field Artillery Brigade that conduted CWMD operations in Iraq, and comprises
of task forces that play a pivotal role in the execution of its mandate(Kaufman, E., &
Hassassian, 2014). The U.S Army currently comprises of CBRNE units that have got
interoperable deployment capacity that enables them to effectively operate in highly
sophisticated CBRNE environments. These units help the force to utilize its diverse
synergistic strengths in combating CBRNE threats and hazards. The 20th CBRNE
command has progressively evolved into multifunctional force that comprises of
multifunctional units that are tailored to deal with 21st century CBRNE
threats(Kuznetsov, 2014).
Mid-level managers’ approaches to Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction.
The middle level manager’s approach to CWMD may vary based on the strategic
focus of the Government agency (WMA, 2003). This section focuses on The Critical
Threat Reduction (CTR) program which manages CWMD projects that focus on overseas
threat reduction under the United States DoD. Middle level managers use different
approaches in CWMD. Their overall approach pertains to the management and oversight
internal program controls that ensure effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation
of the CTR program. The first approach is continuous assessment of the CTR project, as
well as elimination of potential weaknesses to reduce the possibility of failure (UDUM,
2013). The middle level managers are developing specific guidelines and report
objectives and cost management aspects. They also ensure that scheduling is
accomplished and that there is communication with the recipient nation. Middle level
managers ensure that DoD’s internal controls are aligned to the U.S government
standards (Payne, 2015). There mandate is to ensure that internal control framework is
fully operational and aligned to the overall objective of the mission. They manage CTR
program policy and acquisition hence improving the CTR project implementation
success. Middle level managers prepare reports on project costs, project scheduling and
performance. They participate in the assessment of CTR project risks with other
stakeholders in which they provide their risk assessment report. Middle level managers
ensure that CTR projects were meeting the program goals of critical threat reduction.
Middle level managers collaborate with the officials of the recipient countries through the
CTR office (Kuznetsov, 2014).
The DoD middle-level management participate in agreement negotiations with the
CTR partner state offocials, create and enforce poject specific guidelines, manage the
project budget and periodically report to congress on the the project progress (UDUM,
2013).. Middle level management develops comprehensive project implementation
roadmaps and tracks the project implementation from beginning to completion. They
have the technical expertise necessary to manage CTR programs while ensuring that cost,
performance and schedule requirements are fully met (Payne, 2015).Given that CTR
currently works with partner states through American firms, the middle level
management has a responsibility if executing and managing TR project contractors.
Middle level managers are mandated to regularly evaluate and manage risks associated to
the CTR project (Kaufman & Hassassian, 2014). According to a DoD internal report on
risk assessment and mitigation, $200 Million was sunk in a Russian based CTR project
for construction of a liquid rocket fuel facility that was never implemented. Thus the
middle level management plays a pivotal role of risk evaluation and mitigation. The
middle level managers in the Office of Under Secretary of Defense (USD) for Policy
ensure policy coordination, general guidance and definition of objectives(Kuznetsov,
2014). The CTR policy managers provide strategic implementation oversight in
collaboration with the USD Office.
Enduring skills and recollection
The 2nd Infantry Division of the U.S Army conducts tactical operations that are
prolonged maneuvers that involve the use of all arms (Tama, 2015). This is aimed at
equipping the Army officers with the critical endurance skills that are key in the CWMD
tactical operations. Thus Army officers acquire skills such as isolation, seizure and
securing of a location after a WMD attack (Burton, Burpo & Garcia, 2016) . These
deliberate enduring CWMD missions encompass the operation phase which involves
CWMD mock operations in an industrialized WMD real life operational environment.
This mock tactical operation involves the disposal of explosive ordinance devices, and as
such it predisposes the 2nd Infantry Division to various tactical enablers needed to secure
a WMD incidence site (Daulton & Shavce, 2014). Depending on the objective of the
mission, the tactical operation can take up to a week. After completion of the tactical
exploitation, the next phase involves the arrival of follow-on forces who proceeds with
the strategic objective to completion. Tactical patience is critical to the CWMD
operations; hence this skill is inculcated during the operation (UDUM, 2013).. One key
skill required in CWMD tactical operations is CBRNE training with the U.S Marine
Cops. However, the officers must first learn passive defense in order to acquire both
physical and cognitive hardening and protective posture in mission critical CWMD
operations (Burton, Burpo & Smoak, 2015). The most critical endurance skill obtained is
the hardening for prolonged operations. Besides, the 2nd Infantry Division and their 82 nd
Airborne Division counterparts receive CBRN special training under the Special Forces
Command which includes, CBRN equipment maintenance skills. Endurance in the
operation in full protective gear for prolonged periods is critical to both psychological
and physical hardening of the officers which is skill level 1 as they will be handling
dangerous material for prolonged durations, and especially in unfamiliar
environments(Payne, 2015). Officers in the CWMD program must also learn how to use
technical enablers whereas conventional forces must learn target identification. All U.S
Army CBRNE officers receive a warrant officer course that provides extensive CBRNE
equipment training that encompass CBRNE detection and analysis tools. This task is
largely handled by the the 23 rd CBRNE Batallion that operates across the CBRN spectrum
(Daulton & Shavce, 2014). The 23 rd CBRNE Battalion is a sub-unit of the 2 nd infantry
division (2ID).
Recollection
The CBRNE Command comprises of CBRN Warrant Officers who act as the
technical experts within their specific command units(Payne, 2015). The CBRN officers
work under the Chemical Corps division and are now operating under the CBRN
response team based on the recently published Force Design Update (FDU). The 23rd
CBRN warrant officers comprise the CBRNE Battalion that has been engaged in different
counter-WMD operations in the Korean peninsula. According to Pottinger and Hilburgh
(2016), The 23rd CBRNE Battalion have enormolus responsibilities that range from
technical ,operational to tactical within the U.S Army. Among other tasks, the Battalion
performs NBCRV and DRSKO roles within the U.S Army.
Warrant officers in charge of the Battalion usually have at least 10 warrant
officers under them to provide technical and operational assistance. Battalion warrant
officers within the CBRN command plays two important roles namely role modeling and
mentorship of newly enlisted officers(Kuznetsov, 2014). These are enormous
responsibilities which require that the warrant officers be relinquished of their daily
administrative duties. CBRN warrant officers should not be involved in the appraisal of
junior soldiers, and hence this role should be left to the top military sergeants in the
company. This will be an advantage not only to the CBRN warrant officers but their
entire units as well as their combat readiness and boost their morale(Payne, 2015). The
Battalion and Company CBRN officers enjoy seniority within the Battalion and have
greater roles and responsibilities as compared to other warrant officers. While the
Battalion CBRN officer oversees all technical operations within the Battalion, the
Company CBRN officer heads the training and technical division within the
company(Kuznetsov, 2014).
The Restrictions of a Coordinating Authority
The U.S DoD is the CWMD national coordinating authority. DoD’s mandate in
protecting the American Citizen’s from CBRNE threats is threefold: destination nations,
end new acquisition, end usage and drastically reduce the impact of WMD (Payne, 2015).
The authority works toward accomplishing three priority goals which are reduction of
state incentives to acquire, use, acquire and proliferate the weapons of mass destruction.
Other functions of the coordinating authority includes management of WMD relates risks
especially those arising from state and non-state actors (UDUM, 2013).). It has a
responsibility of reducing the risk of a WMD attack from rogue or failed states based on
an integrated defense approach. Through these milestones, the CWMD coordinating
authority accomplished its core mandate of protecting the American people and overseas
allies from CBRNE threats (Kuznetsov, 2014). It plays its primary role through a
comprehensively defined CWMD framework that focuses on global security, partnerships
and coordinated action. The coordinating authority employs diverse restrictive strategies
that encompass dissuasion of state acquisition of WMD while using deterrence against
those that already have. The DoD accomplishes this noble goal through global security
restrictions that includes restriction of acquisition and restrictions on usage, retention, use
of sanctions and countering the perceived importance of WMD (UDUM, 2013).). The
U.S, through the DoD places nuclear proliferation restrictions on nations that already
possess nuclear weapons. This restriction helps guarantee the security of the United
States, its partners and allies. The CWMD coordinating authority further increases
restrictions on the acquisition, use and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction
(Kaufman & Hassassian, 2014).). In the implementation of this objective, DoD works
with diverse federal agencies and international security organisations such as the U.N
Security Council to manage risks related to the proliferation of WMD (Kuznetsov,.
2014). Thus DoD works with all Federal and State agencies in its effort of countering
weapons of mass destruction.
According to Kaufman & Hassassian (2014). Management of risks emanating
from WMD use by rogue or failed states is a key restrictive role of the coordinating
authority . In this endeavor DoD in partnership with other states restricts the movement
or transfer of CBRNE material or its creation within rogue or failed states (Payne, 2015).
These restrictions extend to protection, response and recovery of stolen WMD especially
in poorly governed nuclear states. This is a complex endeavor which DoD performs
through an integrated approach that includes the use of military force and international
cooperation (Lee, 2013).
Another restrictive strategy used by DoD is the use of a multilayered, integrated
defense system that incorporates all U.S government agencies and other international
state actors (18). DoD uses effective measures and counter measures geared toward
safeguarding the homeland and other U.S strategic interests abroad. Towards this
endeavor, DoD ensures that CWMD measures are dynamic and continuously changing to
cater for the rapidly changing global environment (Kuznetsov, 2014).). Still, the
coordinating authority constantly reviews WMD acquisition and proliferation restrictions.
To accomplish this objective, DoD employs a pathway defeat strategy which targets,
disables or destroys the capabilities of the identified state or non-state actors by rendering
their networks dysfunctiona (Kaufman, E., & Hassassian, 2014).
Harmonization with various authorities
USANCA collaborates with DTRA in making plans geared towards combatting
weapons of mass destruction (WMD). The two agencies have got harmonized priorities,
missions and capabilities that are meant to ensure that the United States and its Allies are
safeguarded from WMA threats (UDUM, 2013). USANCA operates under the Army G-
3/5/7 umbrella and focuses on combating WMD among other CBRNE mandates
(Kuznetsov, 2014).). The agency coordinates with other government agencies under the
DoD. USANCA works in close coordination with the CBRN operational command and
has 34 personnel comprising of Army civilians and other officers attached to the U.S
Army’s CBRN command (Lee, 2013). As the WMA coordinating authority, USANCA
plays a key role in building the Army Service Command capability and CWMD readiness
and expertise. In accomplishing this goal, USANCA works closely with the defense
Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in efforts directed at combating CBRNE threats.
DTRA provides troop deployment logistics, assessment, mitigation and research support
((Kaufman & Hassassian, 2014). Therefore USANCA works closely with the other U.S
government agencies, U.S Army, U.S allies and global partners in countering the
proliferation, acquisition and use of Weapons of Mass Destruction ((Payne, 2015). The
agency provides combat support through Training and Doctrinal Command (TRADOC).
It’s headed by a Director, who directly reports to the DCG/COS. USANCA has a wide
ranging coordination mandate that requires close collaboration with other government
agencies. Still, the DCG/G3 has overarching control over the operations of USANCA
particularly in CBRN Army reactor program (Lee, 2013). It is responsible for the
establishment and enforcement of nuclear standards. The agency’s director directly
shares program information with the DCG/COS as well as TRADOC. In the
accomplishment of its mandate, USANCA coordinates with different U.S.G agencies
under the DoD (Kuznetsov, 2014).). The communication between the agency and other
government organisations is synchronous and works through formal tasking. The agency
readily shares its information with other agencies on an on-demand basis in accordance
with the agencies security procedures. The DCS, G-3/5/7 is mandated to approve all
CBRN program requirements for research and development, ensuring compliance with
the nuclear and chemical standards. The director of USANCA is entitled to receive
information with regards to taskings that have a link with the Army’s nuclear reactor
initiative (Kuznetsov, 2014) The agency is further obligated to provide CBRN expertise
for operational support of other U.S Army Components, U.S.G and NATO on an on-
demand basis. It is also the role of the USANCA to improve military survivability in the
CBRNE environments (Lee, 2013). To achieve this, the agency works through the U.S
Army nuclear and NBC survivability benchmark. For operation in nuclear environments,
the agency establishes quantitative benchmarks for all U.S Army CBRNE equipment to
enhance the Army survivability ((Payne, 2015).). To accomplish this objective,
USANCA works with the United States Nuclear and Chemical Survivability Committee
Secretariat (NCSCS). As a CWMD coordinating authority, USANCA evaluates all the
CBRNE program requirements to ensure that there is absolute compliance with the
survivability programs. Besides, the agency is mandated to closely monitor the Army’s
nuclear and contamination initiatives to ensure operational efficacy. This is a critical role
that is meant to safeguard the U.S Army’s CBRNE command units from internal threats
posed by accidental exposure to CBRNE material (Kuznetsov, 2014).). The agency is
tasked to work with the U.S Army in safeguarding the WMA effects and maintaining
standards across the U.S army. The agency communicates to all other USG security
agencies on the effects of WMA on the U.S military operations (UDUM, 2013).It also
conducts research to establish the adverse effects of CBRNE weapons and regularly
informs other USG agencies on the latest vulnerability and survivability data. USANCA
works closely with all U.S Army units by informing them of the inherent danger posed by
the effects of CBRNE weapons. To accomplish its objective of decreasing the CBRNE
effects on Army Officers, USANCA monitors and manages effects and vulnerability
through identification and prioritization of CBRNE weapon use potential effects
(Kuznetsov, 2014).). USANCA works with the Army Service Component Commanders
(ASCC) and the Joint Forces Land Component Commanders (JFLCC) to evaluate the
adverse impact of WMD on the effective use of tactical maneuvers. These includes the
impact of large CBRNE blasts, radiation as well as other secondary effects directly
related to nuclear radiations and other related electromagnetic effects (Payne, 2015). The
agency works with the Army’s CBRNE command in publishing CBRNE literature and
information. The agency supports data collection on the battlefield after a CBRNE attack,
and renders technical help to ASCC in the site recovery, evacuation and assessment of
CBRNE material on the battlefield. The WMD coordinating authority collaborates with
the U.S Army Chemical School in the improvement of force interoperability (Kuznetsov,
2014).). To achieve this objective, USANCA collaborates with DoD and NATO’s
CBRNE command in the establishment of CBRNE standards. Thus it is DoD’s link with
all NATO CBRNE related groups and organisations. Thus on behalf of the Joint CBRNE
Defense, USANCA represents the United States in NATO working groups and panels,
and articulates the United States position on CBRNE matters (Kaufman & Hassassian,
2014). The agency appoints principle U.S representative. USANCA is further mandated
to enhance the U.S army capability and to oversee joint nuclear operations. It also works
with JFLCC during combat preparation exercises and recruits and retains nuclear
planning personnel. USANCA works with other nuclear doctrine units in accomplishing
joint publication (Lee, 2013)). In collaboration with other U.S Army command units, the
agency establishes a Theatre Nuclear Planning (TNP) protocol. It also works in
collaboration with the Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) in countering weapons
of mass destruction through joint training and planning (UDUM, 2013).). In collaboration
with the U.S army, USANCA maintains consistency in the Army’s CBRNE publications
and further works with diverse U.S government agencies in the characterization diverse
impacts of CBRNE weapons (Kuznetsov, 2014). In collaboration with DTRA, the agency
performs an advisory function to other USG agencies on the adverse effects of CBRNE
weapons. Similarly, it also plays the joint execution role in which case it works with
JFLCC and NATO in the execution of CWMD operations and further supports the United
States Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM) (Kaufman & Hassassian, 2014). In this
endeavor, USANCA also works with agencies such as DTRA and joint operation units in
countering CBRNE threats (Payne, 2015). The agency accomplishes this through
harmonized collaboration with other counter-proliferation agencies, and hence plays a
critical role in the study and evaluation of CBRNE capability of potential adversaries. It
also works with the Army Council for countering WMD to ensure that the U.S Army is
CBRNE ready with respect to response and execution (Kuznetsov, 2014).
USANCA plays a critical role in the enhancement of the U.S Army’s nuclear
disablement capacity through the U.S Army Forces Command (FORSCOM), while
ensuring that the U.S Forces are constantly prepared to deal with CBRNE threats. The
agency supports ASCC’s efforts in countering nuclear proliferation and other
contingency planning initiatives (UDUM, 2013).). To accomplish this objective,
USANCA plans counter-attacks against identified WMD targets and combat forces. The
agency plays a pivotal role in coordination of ASCC and JFLCC during nuclear readiness
combat exercises in conjunction with the DTRA and USSTRATCOM. USANCA works
closely with CBRNE focused U.S Army command units in ensuring that all CBRNE
material are securely stored or disposed in compliance with the ARs 50 5 regulations
(Kaufman & Hassassian, 2014). As such, the agency provides safety, regulatory
assistance and reliability training to U.S army units that are in charge of CBRNE
material. USANCA works with the Army Staff (ARSTAF) by playing the role of policy
liaison between different commands that includes the U.S Army Command (MACOMS)
(Kuznetsov, 2014).). It also works in liaison with other U.S Army Commands in
providing CBRNE program support and training across all military units. Besides,
USANCA provides the DoD with critical information on Army preparedness and
response capability status (Lee, 2013). This information is used by different USG
agencies especially for operational and policy formulation purposes. The agency plays a
key role in initiating and maintaining dialogue on CBRNE readiness with the U.S Army
and USG agencies (Payne, 2015). The Agency works with the Joint Nuclear Accident
and Incident Response Team (JNAIRT) to replace or fill the position of the U.S Army
representative. In addition, USANCA represents the U.S Army on the Nuclear Weapons
Council and Standing committee which regularly reviews the existing nuclear safety
standards. This is a principal role that ensures the safety of the U.S Special Forces
Command during CWMA operations ((Kuznetsov, 2014). USANCA also works with the
U.S Army Safety Office and other relevant authorities in the planning and execution of
demilitarization operations. Furthermore, it conducts safety assessment and support to all
USG agencies and Army units, and onsite visits for purposes of collecting data (Kaufman
& Hassassian, 2014).
Bounded Rationality and Applicability within the US Army
Herbert Simon’s theory of bounded rationality can be integrated within the U.S
Army’s MDMP (Kaufman, E., & Hassassian, 2014). The theory of bounded rationality
underscores the impact of time limitation on the decision formulation capability. Based
on this theory, Simon posists that a problem can either be classified as encounter or set-
piece whereas the former referes to an externaly originating threat that warrants a military
action. On the contrary, setpiece problems particularly arise under exceptional
circumstances that present ample time for a futuristic decision or action ((Kuznetsov,
2014). Thus drawing on the theory of bounded rationally, it is evident that decision
making within various units of the U.S Army is limited by time and unavailability of
information. In the event of a WMD attack, the various commanders will definitely be
faced by decision making dilemma occasioned by time insufficiency, enemy capability
uncertainties and a dearth of intelligence information (UDUM, 2013). Although the U.S
Army relies on the MDMP as a decision-making guideline, the aforementioned
challenges hinder the quality of the decision especially when the decision is individual
rather than group based. The military applies the set-piece model specifically in a group
setting thereby allowing sufficient time for modification (Kuznetsov, 2014).
Notwithstanding the diverse disparities presented in in these two situations, the theory of
bounded rationality acknowledges the distinctness of either encounter or set-piece
problems. William Reitzel supports the bounded rationality assertions by characterizing
them as either puzzles or mere decision making challenges (Kaufman, E., & Hassassian,
2014). According to his argument, there can be no one size fits all decision making
approach. Reitzel underscores that although certain situations could be confronted using a
specific decision-making model, there could still be others that cannot be effectively
confronted thereby necessitating the application of a different approach (Payne, 2015).
This implies that complex situations would typically lack a solution, necessitating the use
of intuition.
In a military combat situation, it is critical that different known variables be
evaluated. Consequently, bounded rationality comes into play given that decisions have
to be made within a limited timeframe, based on insufficient information and an
environment of uncertainty (Kuznetsov, V. N. (2014). Limited time and the need to make
rapid decisions pose a challenge of the practicability of making rational decisions.
According to Simon, the decision maker’s rationality is inherently limited by lack of
information. Still, the decision-makers are bound by not only their perceptions, but their
moral perspectives concerning the expected outcome (Lee, 2013) Based on Simon’s
theory of bounded rationality, a single individual is capable of continuously making
rational decisions under changing circumstances. This is particularly true in the U.S
Army as field commanders have to make rapid decisions with limited time, information
and within an increasingly uncertain battlefield environment (Kaufman & Hassassian,
2014). However, it’s apparent that the degree of uncertainty is significantly lower when
decisions have to be made within a group environment whereas it remains exceptionally
high in an individual decision making setting. A group scenario increases the unit’s
ability to make rapid decisions notwithstanding the diverse rationality limitations
(Kuznetsov, 2014). This is practically true in the U.S Army as collective decision making
helps to lower the effects of time, uncertainty and information insufficiency especially
under complex situations. However according to Reitzel, effective judgment can be made
in complex situations through a comprehensive group deliberation. Based reitzel’s views,
we can conclude that the predicaments that U.S Army grapples with do actually represent
decision-sets (UDUM, 2013). Most combat dilemmas that the U.S commanders have to
content with are informed by a number of underlying problem sub-sets, whose solution
lies in the solution of the primary dilemma. During CWMD tactical operations, the U.S
Special Command (SOCOM) attached to the CBRNE unit and the rest of the
conventional force can apply Simon’s theory of bounded rationality ((Payne, 2015). In
this regard, the decision made by the force commanders in the midst of a counter-WMD
operation is directly connected to the premeditated decision. This situation is common in
the U.S Army given the complex decision making environments that present decision
making dilemmas (Kuznetsov, 2014). Alongside Simon’s theory of bounded rationality,
which calls for enhanced analysis and decision-making, a decision set scenario demands
that comprehensive situational analysis be done prior to undertaking a CWMD operation
as the findings of pre-combat investigation will usually have a direct impact on the
decisions made while the mission is ongoing (Kaufman & Hassassian, 2014). The theory
of bounded rationally necessitates the need for extensive assessment, hence decision-sets
illustrates an existing link between situational analysis and unforeseeable future
decisions. Therefore, based on the Simon’s theory, it’s apparently critical that tactical
planning takes a decision making approach that is highly analytical ((Kuznetsov, 2014).
Therefore, the type of dilemma that military decision makers encounter varies and as
such determines the type of decision-making approach. Thus the U.S Army makes use of
MDMP as the primary decision-making framework is ideal not only in set-piece but in
complex problem situations as well, especially where information is scarce.
Based on Simon’s theory, U.S Army Special Forces Commanders are
inadequately equipped and hence incapable of rational cognitive judgment given that
their inherent human nature limits their information processing capacity (Lee, 2013).
Still, rational decision making before and during tactical combat is limited by three
factors namely information, time and expertise (Kuznetsov, 2014).Thirdly, Simon argues
that human beings have a limited capacity to conceive solutions to all problem situations,
as such; some alternatives are omitted in the analysis. A practical application of bounded
rationality is in the use of rational MDMP where U.S Army decision-makers use problem
simplification approach to filter through numerous alternatives, and to arrive at one key
alternative (Payne, 2015). When limited by time, Army commanders evaluate a number
of decisions that have worked in the past, hence limiting their evaluation to just a few
possible alternatives. However, given scarcity of perfect information, the theory of
bounded rationality recommends satisficing (UDUM, 2013). This implies that U.S Army
decision makers will tend to derive a solution that is only sub-optimally effective. In
other words, they settle for an alternative that can minimally satisfy the pre-existing
criteria. In retrospect, the ‘Operation desert Shield’ that toppled Saddam Hussein can be
perceived as a satisficed decision that minimally satisfied the criteria that was in force
(Kuznetsov, 2014).
The application of bounded rationality within the U.S Army combat context
presents implicit alternative options (118). In application, it implies that notwithstanding
the availability of wide ranging alternatives, there is always a preferred alternative hence
rendering the use of decision criteria impractical. The U.S Army Special Forces
Command in charge of CBRNE operations can have its decision makers integrate
bounded rationality principles within the wider MDMP decision framework ((Payne,
2015).
Applicability within the US Army
Herbert Simon’s theory of bounded rationality can be integrated within the U.S
Army’s Military Decision Making Process (MDMP) although it largely draws from the
theory of rationality (Lee, I.H. (2013)). The theory of bounded rationality underscores the
impact of time limitation on the eficacy of decision formulation capability ((Kuznetsov,
V. N. (2014).). Based on this theory, Simon posits that a problem can either be classified
as encounter or set-piece whereas the former refers to an externally originating threat that
warrants a military action (617). On the contrary, set-piece problems particularly arise
under exceptional circumstances that present ample time for a futuristic decision or action
(UDUM, Ş. (2013).). Thus drawing on the theory of bounded rationally, it is evident that
decision making within various units of the U.S Army is limited by time and
unavailability of information. In the event of a WMD attack, the various commanders
will definitely be faced by decision making dilemma occasioned by time insufficiency,
enemy capability uncertainties and a dearth of intelligence information ((Kuznetsov, V.
N. (2014).). Although the U.S Army relies on the MDMP as a decision-making guideline,
the aforementioned challenges hinder the quality of the decision especially when the
decision is individual rather than group based. The military applies the set-piece model
specifically in a group setting thereby allowing sufficient time for modification
(Kuznetsov, V. N. (2014).Notwithstanding the diverse disparities presented in in these
two situations, the theory of bounded rationality acknowledges the distinctness of either
encounter or set-piece problems. William Reitzel supports the bounded rationality
assertions by characterizing them as either puzzles or mere decision making challenges
(Payne, 2015).). According to his argument, there can be no one size fits all decision
making approach. Reitzel underscores that although certain situations could be
confronted using a specific decision-making model, there could still be others that cannot
be effectively confronted thereby necessitating the application of a different approach
((Kaufman & Hassassian, 2014). This implies that complex situations would typically
lack a solution, necessitating the use of intuition.
In a military combat situation, it is critical that different known variables be
evaluated. Consequently, bounded rationality comes into play given that decisions have
to be made within a limited timeframe, based on insufficient information and an
environment of uncertainty (Kuznetsov, 2014). Limited time and the need to make rapid
decisions pose a challenge of the practicability of making rational decisions. According
to Simon, the decision maker’s rationality is inherently limited by lack of information.
Still, the decision-makers are bound by not only their perceptions, but their moral
perspectives concerning the expected outcome (UDUM, 2013). Based on Simon’s theory
of bounded rationality, a single individual is capable of continuously making rational
decisions under changing circumstances. This is particularly true in the U.S Army as field
commanders have to make rapid decisions with limited time, information and within an
increasingly uncertain battlefield environment. However, it’s apparent that the degree of
uncertainty is significantly lower when decisions have to be made within a group
environment whereas it remains exceptionally high in an individual decision making
setting. A group scenario increases the unit’s ability to make rapid decisions
notwithstanding the diverse rationality limitations (Payne, 2015).This is practically true
in the U.S Army as collective decision making helps to lower the effects of time,
uncertainty and information insufficiency especially under complex situations. However
according to Reitzel, effective judgment can be made in complex situations through a
comprehensive group deliberation. Based reitzel’s views, we can conclude that the
predicaments that U.S Army grapples with do actually represent decision-sets
(Kuznetsov, 2014). Most combat dilemmas that the U.S commanders have to content
with are informed by a number of underlying problem sub-sets, whose solution lies in the
solution of the primary dilemma. During CWMD tactical operations, the U.S Special
Command (SOCOM) attached to the CBRNE unit and the rest of the conventional force
can apply Simon’s theory of bounded rationality (Kaufman, E., & Hassassian, 2014). In
this regard, the decision made by the force commanders in the midst of a counter-WMD
operation is directly connected to the premeditated decision. This situation is common in
the U.S Army given the complex decision making environments that present decision
making dilemmas (Kuznetsov, 2014). Alongside Simon’s theory of bounded rationality,
which calls for enhanced analysis and decision-making, a decision set scenario demands
that comprehensive situational analysis be done prior to undertaking a CWMD operation
as the findings of pre-combat investigation will usually have a direct impact on the
decisions made while the mission is ongoing. The theory of bounded rationally
necessitates the need for extensive assessment, hence decision-sets illustrates an existing
link between situational analysis and unforeseeable future decisions (Payne, 2015).
Therefore, based on the Simon’s theory, it’s apparently critical that tactical planning
takes a decision making approach that is highly analytical. Therefore, the type of
dilemma that military decision makers encounter varies and as such determines the type
of decision-making approach (UDUM, 2013). Thus the U.S Army makes use of MDMP
as the primary decision-making framework is ideal not only in set-piece but in complex
problem situations as well, especially where information is scarce.
Based on Simon’s theory, U.S Army Special Forces Commanders are
inadequately equipped and hence incapable of rational cognitive judgment given that
their inherent human nature limits their information processing capacity (212). Still,
rational decision making before and during tactical combat is limited by three factors
namely information, time and expertise (Kuznetsov, 2014).). Thirdly, Simon argues that
human beings have a limited capacity to conceive solutions to all problem situations, as
such; some alternatives are omitted in the analysis. A practical application of bounded
rationality is in the use of rational MDMP where U.S Army decision-makers use problem
simplification approach to filter through numerous alternatives, and to arrive at one key
alternative (UDUM, 2013). When limited by time, Army commanders evaluate a number
of decisions that have worked in the past, hence limiting their evaluation to just a few
possible alternatives. Given scarcity of perfect information, the theory of bounded
rationality recommends satisficing ((Payne, 2015). This implies that U.S Army decision
makers will tend to derive a solution that is only sub-optimally effective. In other words,
they settle for an alternative that can minimally satisfy the pre-existing criteria. In
retrospect, the ‘Operation desert Shield’ that toppled Saddam Hussein can be perceived
as a satisficed decision that minimally satisfied the criteria that was in force (Kuznetsov,
2014).
The use of bounded rationality within the U.S Army combat context presents
implicit alternative options (Kuznetsov, 2014). In application, it implies that
notwithstanding the availability of wide ranging alternatives, there is always a preferred
alternative hence rendering the use of a decision criteria impractical ((Kaufman &
Hassassian, 2014). The U.S Army Special Forces Command in charge of CBRNE
Command can have its decision makers integrate bounded rationality principles within
the wider MDMP decision framework.
Rational decision making is a critical component within the U.S army decision
making framework. This framework is also referred to as the rational comprehensive
approach as it’s directly linked to the economic theory of efficiency optimization, in
which case the best alternative is picked based on a predetermined criteria which is often
time contingent to the MDMP (Kuznetsov,2014). Within the rational decisional making
context, military decision makers must go through an iterative process of definite goal
setting, possible alternatives, assessment of consequences, derive a favorable alternative
based on a predetermined criteria and implementation of the selected alternative (UDUM,
2013). The rational model of decision making is simple, and hence commonly used in the
U.S Army. This is because of its intuitive and structured nature of creating sensible
solutions. The rational approach addresses the uncertainty inherent in most military
operations (Kaufman & Hassassian, 2014).). The U.S military uses this approach to
address problems that are not only simple, but well-structured hence provides military
policy makers a structured decision making framework as it is premised on clarity of
goals and is ideal for tackling technical problems based on a predetermined selection
criteria ((Payne, 2015). However, rational decision making approach is impractical and
inapplicable in the military setup since the goals have to be debated and a solution
collaboratively derived.
The rational decision making approach is an integral component of the Military
decision Making Process (MDMP) and entrenched in the U.S Army’s operational culture.
However, the MDMP process faces significant challenges as top military policy maker’s
focus on the clarity of the expected outcomes as forerunner to the military strategy
formulation and execution (Kuznetsov, 2014). The practicality of the rational approach
within the U.S Army is further complicated by the fact that the Joint Planning and
Execution Community (JPEC) constantly face decision concurrence challenges. This is
further compounded by the complex nature of combat environment, uncertainty and the
alternative selection difficulty (Lee, 2013). The use of rational approach is further
hindered by the fact that military leaders are predominantly concerned with the
objectivity and certainty of the political environment, which seldom is the case. The
Army’s need for objectivity and clarity in goals cannot be ascertained through rational
approach as it’s insufficient and impractical in explaining the uncertainties associated
with political and military operational environments (Payne, 2015).
The applicability of the bounded rationality theory in the U.S Army operations is
largely predicated on the demand for timely decisions. Nonetheless, the success of
tactical operations is proportionate to the decision-making timeframe and the intra-team
coordinated effort (UDUM, 2013). Still, this presents a set-piece–encounter challenge.
While the Army’s Special Forces have to execute counter-WMD operations, they are
prawn to face unit synchronization and set-piece challenges. Notwithstanding these
challenges, the Special Forces Units strives to execute the goal of their top commanders.
In the context of the U.S Army, the tactical environment presents both the puzzle and the
difficult type of challenges.while routine operations demands simple solutions, non-
routine operations requires that the troops make independent problem analysis
(Kuznetsov, 2014). According to bounded rationality, information ambiguity or
insufficiency is one limiting factor to effective decision making. However, CWMD
environment presents numerous tactical challenges to the CBRNE units due to challenges
associated with information gathering and dissemination((Kaufman, E., & Hassassian,
2014).Given the rapidly changing combat environment, the troops face insurmountable
challenges related to immediacy and increased bombardment with conflicting
information. This variance in the information required for decision making jeopardizes
the performance of diverse Army Units (Kuznetsov, 2014). The U.S Army tactical level
decision making is complicated by the fact that both structured and unstructured problem
solving models exist. While the former requires minimal information, the latter requires
substantial information. Still, the dynamic nature of the tactical combat environment
presents numerous challenges due to varying problem types (UDUM, 2013). The tactical
environment presents both intuitive and analytical challenges to the U.S Army CWMD
units. Bounded rationality is thus depicted in the U.S military’s decision making
especially at the tactical level. This is due to the fact that CWMD combat operations
require intuitive decision making while the operation is ongoing. According to Payne
(2015) intuitive decision making is more preferred approach during combat action as
opposed to other analytical models that are best suited to pre-combat and combat
planning environments.
Chapter 3: Research Method
The study will take a qualitative case study approach. It will analyze how mid-
level managers at USANCA and DAMO-SSD utilize their harmonization authority to
make countering WMD decisions and Simon’s TBR for decision making. The case study
employs Simon’s TBR purposely to enhance the academic understanding of USANCA
and DAMO-SSD mid-level managers enduring skill to recollect distinctive countering
WMD information and (2) within the restrictions of a coordination authority association
the techniques they retrieved this material in their decision-making method for winding
WMD dilemmas (Ben-Haim, 2016; Duelfer, 2016; Hochschild & Einstein, 2015; Lotan,
2015). The findings of numerous case studies organized and conducted by the Project on
National Security Reforms (PNSR) have revealed that the United States Government
lacks proper understanding of the complex national security policy issues. Subsequently,
critical national security issues such as terrorism and countering WMD proliferation
continues to go through an old fashioned National Security Council (NSC) system. The
research is further motivated by the fact that the NSC system has a defective decision
making process that is laden with irrelevant bureaucracies that throttle quick decision
making especially on critical issues of national security. As such Simon (1997) posited
that organisations have substructures that create internal systems. Still, organizational
structures play a key role in in influencing decision making. The study will use a
qualitative single-case study that employs nonprobability, focused sampling to interview
O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14 midlevel managers SMEs, and to investigate how within
USANCA and DAMO-SSD organization they create countering WMD proliferation
decisions with insufficient time and inadequate information in a changing environment
(Murgado, 2013).
The research methodology section will comprise of different subsections. These
subsections includes research methodology and design, study population, material and
instrumentation section, operational and definition of variables, data collection and
analysis, assumptions, limitations, delimitations and a summary of the chapter
(Mukhopadhyay & Gupta, 2014). First and foremost, it will comprise of research
methodology and design section that will describe the research methodology and design
that will be employed. This section will provide sufficient detail that would guarantee
explicability of the study in future. This section will also identify alternative
methodologies as proof of the effectiveness of the selected methodology over similar
alternatives. This will be followed by a review of the population sample under the
population and sample section. This section will describe the population characteristics,
its appropriateness and relevance in answering the four research questions (Garcia &
Gluesing, 2013). Besides, it will also state the sample size and discuss its suitability and
relevance in addressing the study problem, purpose and research questions. This section
will also discuss the sampling guidelines that are directly linked to the case study
methodology. The study will provide evidence that saturation will be ascertained through
the selected sample size (Arora, 2017). Evidence will further be presented as proof that
the selected sample size is the minimum required sample size. This section will also
outline how research participants will be recruited. The research participants were
recruited through mailing lists where mid-level managers from USANCA and DAMO-
SSD were targeted. The material and instrumentation section will outline the research
instruments as well as reliability and validity issues (Doz, 2011). Besides, it will also
discuss different field testing and pilot testing instruments, and further provide evidence
that permission for use of the instruments was formerly sought. The operational and
definition of variables section will detail the operational variables used in the study
methodology section. Given that the research takes a qualitative case study approach, the
predictor and criterion that will be used will be stated (Sarma, 2015). The operational
definitions will be based on credible research evidence as well as reliable research
instruments. The study will further identify research instruments that will be used in the
measurement of the variables. Under operational definitions, the level of variable
measurement and the relevant appropriate scores will be established. The study
procedures will outline the necessary steps required for data collection and analysis and it
will also specify the subjects. This will be important in ensuring that the study can be
replicated. The data collection and analysis section will discuss in detail the appropriate
strategies that will be used in coding and analyzing data and software used to accomplish
this task (Garcia & Gluesing, 2013). This step is critical as it ensures that the data
collected can be analyzed and used to answer the research questions. Thus it will
demonstrate how the identified problem will have been answered. This section will also
state discuss the criterion used in the selection of case studies, and their relevance to the
research questions. This section will also discuss the criteria that will be used in
determining the degree to which the study actually met the study purpose and objective
(Arora, 2017). Lastly, this section will discuss how the qualitative case studies selected
will be analyzed through triangulation. The researcher’s role will also be discussed. Next,
the study assumptions will be discussed alongside their corresponding rationale. This will
be followed by a review of the study limitations as well as appropriate measures used to
mitigate these limitations. This will be precedent by a review of the study delimitations as
well as their corresponding rationale. This section will discuss how different research
decisions made were influenced by the current literature and theoretical framework,
followed by a review of ethical issues surrounding the study (Doz, 2011). This section
will also provide proof that the research study proposal was approved by the Northcentral
University Institutional Review Board (IRB) prior to data collection. This section will
also address other issues such as risks posed to the participants, confidentiality and
anonymity, data security, researcher’s role, bias management and topic competency
issues (Garcia & Gluesing, 2013). A summary of the entire chapter will be provided at
the end of chapter summarizing the key points made.
Research Methodology and Design
Research design is a framework that is used to guide research process by
according the researcher with the capability to control known variables that can adversely
impact the validity of the study results (Mukhopadhyay & Gupta, 2014). On the other
hand, Doz (2011) defines it as a plan that outlines how research data is to be manipulated
(12), or the researcher’s overarching framework for tackling research questions or
hypotheses (Garcia & Gluesing, 2013). The propose study will attempt to establish the O-
5/0-4 and GS-13/14 mid-level manager’s perceptions of the TBR decision model on the
USANCA and DAMO-SSD enterprise decision making procedures in support of DA and
DOD collaboration with other USG authorities in countering WMD proliferation.
Secondly, the study aims at establishing the O-5/0-4 and GS-13/14 midlevel manager’s
observation with regards to the functions of the TBR decision model for USANCA and
DAMO-SSD decision making models. Lastly, it will seek to explore to what extent
Simon’s TBR decision model impacts the enduring capability of USANCA and DAMO-
SSD, O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14 midlevel managers to approach, remember and salvage
distinctive countering WMD knowledge for complex WMD proliferation problem
decisions. The study will employ a non-experimental, qualitative approach. The study
approach will also be exploratory and descriptive as it will focus on answering the
research questions.
A qualitative approach is a methodological, yet subjective approach that is used to
attach meaning to various situations. Garcia & Gluesing (2013) assert that a qualitative
approach underscores the experiences and distinctiveness of the individual participants.
Still, Holloway and wheeler describes it as a social enquiry process that deliberately
seeks to establish how people conceptualize and derive meaning from their experiences.
According to Sarma (2015) researchers use the qualitative approach to inquire into
perspectives, experiences and behavioral attributes of people with the view of gaining
insight into various aspects. The researcher will focus on understanding the experiences
of the participants who will be O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14 midlevel managers drawn from
USANCA and DAMO-SSD with Simon’s TBR decision making approach. To
accomplish this objective, the researcher will personally participate in the investigation
hence adding a distinct twist to data collection and analysis. The objectivity and
preciseness of the study will not be possible given the unpredictability and subjectivity of
the human participants (Solis, Aristomene, Feitosa & Smith, 2016). The rationale for
employing a qualitative design was premised on the need to explore the experiences,
opinions and perspectives of O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14 midlevel managers on the
effectiveness of TBR in the military decision making process. It was considered due to its
appropriateness in answering the research questions as compared to other research
approaches.
Replicable Study Procedure
The study will be divided into conceptual, narrative, interpretive, exploratory,
descriptive and contextual research phases (Guercini, 2014). The conceptual phase
involved the formulation of the three research questions that would inform the study. The
research questions were framed and refined through brainstorming. The direct
participation of the researcher in the study will help in shaping and refocusing the
research. A comprehensive literature review was conducted on the topic, hence helping
the researcher abandon preconceived bias on the TBR decision making framework used
by USANCA and DAMO-SSD midlevel managers.
Narrative will mark the second phase, and it will entail overall research design
formulation and planning (Guercini, 2014). The researcher is the primary data collection
instrument. The researcher utilized ten (10) participants who satisfied a pre-defined
inclusion criterion. Non-probability sampling technique will be used in the sampling of
research participants (Garcia & Gluesing, 2013). The narrative phase will be followed
with the interpretative phase. This phase will involve collecting qualitative data and
analysis. The researcher conducted a search on different military databases that includes
Proquest and Ebscohost. A predetermined search criterion will be used in locating peer
reviewed research journals, books and articles with relevance to the research topic. Both
the research questions and the research topic were used in deriving appropriate search
terms. Besides, various search filtering options were used such as date of publication, full
text and publication title. On Ebscohost, the following search filtering tools were used:
scholarly (Peer Reviewed) Journals, search within the full text of the articles, related
words, related words and equivalent subjects (Ebscohost, 2018). Besides, the researcher
used search modes and expanders such as Boolean/Phrase, Find all, Find any search
terms and smarttext serach option.
First, the researcher reviewed abstracts of peer reviewed journals and articles that
were deemed relevant, and that satisfied the inclusion criteria. The interpretive phase will
be followed by the exploratory phase. In this phase, the researcher will explore the
opinion of USANCA and DAMO-SSD midlevel managers on the use of TBR decision
making framework. Exploratory approach was selected due to its appropriateness in
investigating the phenomenon and all the associated aspects (Thomas, 2010). Even
though numerous studies have been previously conducted on the decision making models
used by the U.S Army, few of this studies have focused on the perspective of middle-
level managers on the efficacy of Simon’s TBR decision model in making counter-WMD
decisions. Thirdly, a descriptive approach will be employed as it is known to provide an
ideal framework for capturing natural phenomenon, and can be used as a justification for
the current practice, and as a basis for formulating judgment and theories (Jiggins &
Evans, 2016). Thus it will be used to capture the perspective and opinion of midlevel
managers with regards to TBR usage within the Army’s midlevel ranks. Finally, context
will be used as it will help the researcher to understand the environment and conditions at
USANCA and DAMO-SSD coordinating authorities. It will also prove instrumental in
understanding the culture and management doctrine at these top defense organisations
(Kim, Sefcik & Bradway, 2017). Participants, who were largely midlevel managers were
drawn from these two organisations that are directly involved in countering WMD. Thus,
the opinion of midlevel managers at these two institutions will be quintessential in
understanding the U.S. Army Countering Weapons of Mass Destruction Coordination
Authority Relationships and the application of Simon’s TBR in the midlevel management
context. The coordinating authority relationships and the TBR decision model use can be
best understood and captured within the context of these two coordinating authorities.
Population and Sample
The proposed qualitative case study will analyze how mid-level managers at
USANCA and DAMO-SSD make countering WMD decisions and Simon’s TBR for
decision-making (Simon, 1961, 1978, 1997). Thus midlevel managers will comprise the
study population. The target population will be midlevel managers working at USANCA
and DAMO-SSD and who satisfies the study sampling criteria. First and foremost, the
midlevel managers will have to be directly involved in CWMD programs. The second
inclusion criterion is that the managers should have current or past experience working
with TBR decision making model. The sampled midlevel managers will have been
involved or are currently engaged in joint counter weapons of mass destruction decision
making process that gives them the opportunity to understand the relationship between
DOD, USANCA, DAMO-SSD, related USG agencies and counter-WMD authorities.
The sampled midlevel managers will have to be in either O-5/O-4 or GS-13/14
category. They will also have to be directly involved in DA and DOD collaborative
efforts for countering the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The managers
should also have thorough knowledge and understanding of the TBR decision making
model and the harmonization of USANCA and DAMO-SSD with other counter-WMA
agencies. Thirdly, the managers will be interviewed to ascertain to what extend they
understand Simon’s TBR decision model, and its subsequent impact on the enduring
capability of USANCA and DAMO-SSD. A sample size of 20 middle-level managers
will be interviewed. The total sample size will comprise of 10 middle-level managers
from USANCA and the other 10 from DAMO-SSD. These sample size will be
appropriate given the objective and scope of the study. A smaller sample size was
selected since qualitative studies are well conducted based on smaller sample sizes, and
given that the findings remain relatively constant with increase in sample size (Kim,
Sefcik & Bradway, 2017). Based on the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR)
findings that the United States Government (USG) misunderstands how to approach
complex national security policy issues (Dicicco, 2014; Flournoy & Brimley, 2006;
Travers, Van Boven & Judd, 2014), increased complexity in national security policy
issues like terrorism and WMD proliferation, and the continued use of old-fashioned
National Security Council (NSC) system (Dicicco, 2014; Flournoy & Brimley, 2006;
Travers, Van Boven & Judd, 2014), these sample size will be adequate in capturing the
midlevel perspective on the application of Simon’s TBR decision model in their
workplace. The sample size selected will be adequate in attaining saturation particularly
considering the finite population of midlevel managers in the target organisations
(Gerring, 2004). The participants will be recruited through email lists. The sampled
middle-level managers will be contacted through their official organizational emails. An
email seeking permission to have them participate in the interview will be sent to them
with the research approval letter from the university annexed. Emails for O-5/O-4 and
GS-13/14 middle-level managers will be obtained from the USANCA and DAMO-SSD
headquarters with permission from the DOD.
Materials/Instrumentation
The case study qualitative approach will utilize an interview script. The interview
script will be the primary data collection instrument. It will be designed and formulated
to capture data that will be relevant to answering the three research questions. The
validity and reliability of the interview script will be determined prior to its
administration (Hupey, 2005). Firstly, the interview script will capture the O-5/O-4 and
GS-13/14 midlevel manager’s perceptions of the TBR decision model, O-5/O-4 and GS-
13/14 midlevel manager’s observation of the function of the TBR decision model and the
impact of TBR decision model on the enduring capability of USANCA and DAMO-SSD.
The interview script will be designed by the researcher and emailed to the supervisors for
approval prior to field testing for purposes of establishing the validity and reliability of
the instrument (Thomas, 2010). The results obtained from the pilot study will be used as
a basis of making further modifications and enhancements to the research instrument to
ensure its effectiveness in capturing relevant research data. A series of modifications will
be made to the research instrument to reduce the margin of error. The research instrument
will be designed and presented to the dissertation committee for approval, and its original
copy annexed in the appendices section. According to Ridder (2017) qualitative studies
employ similar data collection techniques, even through in varing proportions. The case
study design employs observation, interviews and documentation review. Although the
study will rely on interview and documentation review, the preceding section discusses
other qualitative research designs apart from the case study approach.
Qualitative Research Designs
Ethnography Approach
Ethnography is a qualitative research design in which the researcher gets
immersed in the research environment with a view of getting first-hand experience with
regards to the dynamics of the study environment (Goulding, 2005). These challenges
may encompass the target participant’s culture, goals and other challenges. Unlike other
qualitative designs, ethnography compels the researcher to become a participant observer
(Garcia & Gluesing, 2013). This design was not selected because the current study has
time limitations, while this design requires time. Still, joining the middle-level
management at USANCA and DAMO-SSD in order to understand their view of the TBR
decision making model would stil have not been practical. Given the utmost
confidentiality of the data and information handled, it would not have been feasible. The
research questions do not warrant the researcher’s first-hand information. Getting the
opinion of middle level managers on the use of Simon’s TBR Decision model does not
necessarily require the researcher’s direct participation. Additionally, Goulding (2005)
suggests that this method involves direct observation which is not the right instrument for
the proposed study.
Narrative Approach
A narrative approach involves piecing together fragmented pieces of information
obtained from few people, usually one or two to construct a complete story (Goulding,
2005). It also involves conduction of interviews, review of documentation and a search
for themes as it seeks to capture a wider perspective. The instrument for this design is
usually comprehensive interviews and in-depth documentation review (Goulding, 2005).
Given the nature of organisations under study, the narrative approach could not
adequately answer the research questions. This is because it would not appropriately
capture the multiple and varying perspectives of the middle-level managers with regards
to the effectiveness of TBR decision model in the U.S Army, and specifically at
USANCA and DAMO-SSD.
Phenomenological Approach
Phenomenological approach is largely descriptive, and hence ideal for capturing
events, activities and phenomenon (Hepworth, Grunewald & Walton, 2014). While this
study design involves the use of multiple instruments such as interviews and
documentary analysis, it is best suited for studying a phenomenon. As such, it was
considered ineffective in answering research questions as the current study seeks to
capture the perspective of the participants with regards to a particular phenomenon.
Although it could be used to capture the participant’s perspective on the use of TBR
decision model, its descriptiveness would not sufficiently answer the research questions.
It was rejected because the current study is non-phenomenological and hence there is no
need of conducting a series of interviews as is usually the case with phenomenological
studies (Hepworth, Grunewald & Walton, 2014). Thirdly, it requires 5-25 interviews to
be conducted, which is beyond the scope of the current study.
Grounded Theory
While phenomenological approach underscores activities and events, grounded
theory always seeks to investigate the theory behind the activities or events (Bowyer &
Davis, 2012). Like other qualitative research designs, it usually relies on interviews and
documentary analysis. The dataset obtained is then used to construct a theory. However,
it involves larger sample sizes, usually between 20-60 interviews to develop a theory
(Evans, 2015). This design would have been ideal for the current study; however it was
rejected for two reasons. First and foremost, it does not seek to develop a theory, but
rather, it seeks to establish the participant’s perception, observation and degree of
applicability of a theoretical decision model (Simon’s TBR) within USANCA AND
DAMO-SSD and other counter-WMD authorities under the U.S DoD (Loonam, 2014).
Secondly, it was rejected because it requires a sequence of 20-60 interviews in 20-60
organisations which is beyond the scope of the current study. Although it could have
been used to gain understanding of the application of TBR model by O-5/O-4 and GS-
13/14 middle-level managers at USANCA and DAMO-SSD, the researcher felt that it
did not fully meet the requirements of the current research.
Case Study Approach
Cas study is the most prevalent and widely prefered qualitative research technique
(Welch et al., 2011). A case study approach involves a comprehensive study of a specific
situation as opposed to conducting a blanket survey, and is used by qualitative
researchers to narrow down a wide field of study with the view of deriving a researchable
topic (Alex da, Näslund & Jasmand, 2012). It has been proved to be ideal in testing real-
life application of theoretical models, hence the reason why it was selected. Its efficacy
was premised on the fact that the current study seeks to establish the perspective of
middle-level managers on the use of Simon’s Theory of Bounded Rationality (TBR)
decision model. Secondly, it was selected because the proposed study targets two
organisations namely USANCA and DAMO-SSD. Compared to other research designs, it
was considered suitable due to its effectiveness in testing real-life application of
theoretical models (Welch et al., 2011). Thirdly, it was selected because unlike other
designs, it can focus on a single organization. The researcher felt that the case study
approach would be appropriate in answering the three research questions, besides
providing O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14 middle-level manager’s perspective on the application
of TBR decision model. Still, a case study seeks thorough understanding of an entity or
event through a deductive approach targeting multiple data sources. Unlike other research
designs, case studies can be explanatory or exploratory (Welch et al., 2011). Just like
phenomenological design, it can also be descriptive. The case study will employ
interviews, observation and archival document evaluation.
The primary source of data will be participant interviews where O-5/O-4 and GS-
13/14 middle-level managers at USANCA and DAMO-SSD will be interviewed. A
sample size of twenty (20) middle-level managers will be selected through stratified,
non-probabilistic sampling where 10 partcipants will be drawn from each organisation.
Nonetheless, Alex da, Näslund & Jasmand (2012) suggests that the case study data
collection phase can pose a challenge especially considering that it requires multiple
sources to be used. According to Welch et al. (2011), other sources of data for qualitative
studies includes document evaluation and observation. Observation entails watching
participants within their natural environment (Gerring, 2004). In the proposed study, the
researcher will guide and direct the interview process. The second and more important
source of data will be archival document analysis. Archival documements obtained from
USANCA and DAMO-SSD that meet the research inclusion criteria will be reviewed for
relevant information that answers the research questions (Ridder, 2017). Besides,
authoritative reports and published articles particularly in the military journals will be
used as data sources. Other data sources will include written record, communications,
internal articles and pamphlets.
Operational Definitions of Variables
The population represents the number of participants who shall be middle level
managers. It also includes the number of archival documents that will be reviewed, and
the number of participants that will be observed. The population sample size will be
n=20. Stratified, probabilistic sampling will be used in which case every middle level
manager at USANCA and DAMO-SSD will have an equal chance of being interviewed.
Similarly, the observation sample size will be, n=20 and will involve the researcher going
into the study organisations to observe the participants. Still, the number of documents
that to be reviewed will be n=50. A larger sample size was selected due to the need to
capture a wider perspective on the use of Simon’s TBR decision model among middle
level managers. Non-probabilistic sampling was rejected as it diminished the chances that
a particular participant would be selected, and the need to provide unbiased hence it
could be prawn to bias.
Ethnography Approach: Ethnography is a qualitative research design in which the
researcher gets immersed in the research environment with a view of getting first-hand
experience with regards to the dynamics of the study environment (Goulding, 2005).
Phenomenological appaorch: Phenomenological approach is largely descriptive, and
hence ideal for capturing events, activities and phenomenon (Hepworth, Grunewald &
Walton, 2014).
Grounded Theory: A qualitative research design that always seeks to investigate the
theory behind activities or events, usually relies on interviews and archival document
analysis (Bowyer & Davis, 2012).
Narrative Approach: A narrative approach involves piecing together fragmented pieces
of information obtained from few people, usually one or two to construct a complete
story (Goulding, 2005).
Case study: Involves indepth study of a specific situation as opposed to conducting a
blanket survey, and is used by qualitative researchers to narrow down a wide field of
study with the view of deriving a researchable topic (Alex da, Näslund & Jasmand,
2012). It is ideal for testing real life aplication of theoretical models.
Observation – A qualitative data collection method that involves watching the participant
within the study environment and involve taking notes.
Interviewing – A data collection method in which the researcher directs or guides the
data collection method by asking questions.
Sample –Refers to a subset of the population under study
The study variables will be derived from the study questions, and were measured using
levels from low, medium to high. The specific data scores were incorporated in the data
analysis section.
Study Procedures
Data will be collected through structured interviews administered by the
researcher. The interview will be guided by an interview script which will comprise pre-
defined questions to be answered by the participants. The researcher will make
appointment with each of the sampled 20 middle level managers for purposes of
conducting the interview. The interview date will be scheduled in agreement with the
participants. Given the complexity and nature of the participant’s job, the interviews will
be conducted though the telephone. The managers will be interviewed from their
workplace to ensure high data accuracy and minimal interruptions. Interviewing will be
conducted separately for each participant. The interviews will be largely structured and
semi-structured.
Data Collection and Analysis
After data collection, coding will be done with the aid of a statistical software.
The data collected will be captured and analyzed using Envivo, a qualitative statistical
software. During data coding, the researcher will ensure that the data captured is relevant
and that it specifically answers the research questions. Since the purpose of the study is to
determine the perspective of USANCA and DAMO-SSD middle level management’s
perspective on the effectiveness of TBR decision model, the collected data will be
reviewed to ascertain its accuracy and validity in addressing this besides answering the
research questions. After collection, the data will be entered into Envivo. Data processing
and analysis will then follow using diverse triangulation techniques. The primary role of
the researcher will be results interpretation and analysis of findings and its application in
the context of the study objectives.
Assumptions
- Since stratified, random probabilistic sampling will be used, the assumption is
that every middle level manager at USANCA and DAMO-SSD understand how
their roles interconnect with the larger institutional goal of countering weapons of
mass destruction. - The second assumption is that every middle level manager’s role has a direct
association with the specific study objective. - Thirdly, the study assumes that the sampled O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14 middle-level
managers have had equal opportunity observing or using the TBR decision model
and are equally knowledgeable and informed with regards to the decision model.
This is because any variance in the understanding of the TBR model would lower
the validity of the data collected. - Lastly, the study assumes that the sampled USANCA and DAMO-SSD middle-
level manager’s views will be the correct representation of the collective
perspective of all middle level managers. The rationale is that any variance would
invalidate the authenticity of the study findings.
Limitation
The study will face the following specific limitations:
The first limitation is that the study will focus on ‘perceptions’ of O-5/O-4 and GS-
13/14 midlevel managers with regards to their application of TBR decision model on
USANCA and DAMO-SSD in support of DOD’s and DA’ counter-WMD
proliferation.
The second limitation will be the use of ‘observation’ where O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14
midlevel managers will observe the function of the TBR decision model for
USANCA and DAMO-SSD.
The third limitation is that the study will focus on establishing the ‘extent’ or ‘degree’
to which Simon’s TBR decision model impacts the enduring capability of USANCA
and DAMO-SSD. Still, the study will be limited to exploring the O-5/O-4 and GS-
13/14 midlevel managers’ decision making approach to countering WMD
proliferation.
Besides the specific limitations, the study will face the following general limitations
- The study faces time limitation. Considering the scope and nature of the study, the
researcher would have employed a larger sample size if time would have allowed.
This would have increased the confidence level and hence the validity and
reliability of the study findings. - Budgetary limitations. The study faces financial limitation especially in satisfying
the population sample size for the interviews, observation and archival records. - Limitation of Authoritative data sources. Given the nature of the organisations
under study and the nature of information handled, the study could face hurdles in
trying to access authoritative documents due to organizational security and non-
disclosure policies with regards to information dissemination. - Limitation of access to middle level managers. This may pose a challenge to the
research since middle level managers at USANCA and DAMO-SSD work on
multiple projects outside of their workstation. As a result, it may be challenging to
access them. - Limitation of sources. Since the study relies on peer reviewed journals, this would
pose a challenge especially where relevant peer reviewed journals cannot be
accessed. Moreover, the study faces a limitation of source publication date hence
making it difficult to use relevant information from sources older than 5 years.
Ethical Assurances
The researcher will seek approval from the Northcentral University’s Institutional
Review Board (IRB) prior to conducting data collection. Besides, the researcher will
assure the participants that all ethical considerations will be upheld. Given the nature,
confidentiality and sensitivity of the information that will be sought from the middle-
level managers. The perception of O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14 midlevel managers could
conflict with the top level management’s view or the institutional view. As such,
individual views with regards to the TBR decision model will be kept confidential. The
rights of participants will be respected. Thus each individual middle-level manager will
be asked to propose the most convenient time for conducting observation of the function
of the TBR model. The participants will have the freedom to choose the place and time
without compulsion or coercion. The researcher will be non-partisan in the treatment of
the divergent views that will emerge out of the data collection process (Greenwood,
2016). Consequently, each view or perception will be equally weighted to eliminate bias.
The researcher will endeavor to retain the accuracy, actual meaning and interpretation of
the data collected from interviews, observation and archival documents (Kakabadse,
Kakabadse & Kouzmin, 2002). Confidentiality and anonymity will be achieved by
ensuring that there is no mention of the manager’s real names. For this purpose, the
participants will be named ‘participant 1’ through ‘participant 20’. Still, any information
that could identify a particular participant shall not be incorporated in the research. All
data and information collected from the participants will be stored in accordance with the
Northcentral University’s Institutional Review Board (IRB) requirements. This will
ensure absolute confidentiality and non-disclosure of the data or information collected.
The researcher will play the instrumentation role where he shall guide and direct the
telephone interviews. In the observation phase, the researcher will guide the participants
towards the specific relevant information. In the analysis of the archival documents, the
researcher will collect, code and collate the collected information. Since the researcher
has minimal personal and professional experience in the current research topic, restraint
will be exercised to ensure that his prior experience or views on the research topic does
not influence the analysis and interpretation of the study findings (Kakabadse, Kakabadse
& Kouzmin, 2002). The IRB research approval letter will be attached in the appendix of
the dissertation manuscript as evidence that the researcher fully complied with the IRB
requirements.
Summary
The study will employ a qualitative, case study approach where O-5/O-4 and GS-
13/14 midlevel managers at USANCA and DAMO-SSD will be interviewed and
observed to ascertain their perception and views on the use of Simon’s TBR decision
model in making counter–WMD decisions. The study will employ a non-experimental,
qualitative approach. The study design will also be exploratory and descriptive as it will
focus on answering the research questions. Hence, the researcher will focus on
understanding the experiences of the participants who will be O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14
midlevel managers drawn from USANCA and DAMO-SSD with Simon’s TBR decision
making approach, and their enduring skill to recollect distinctive countering WMD
information. The rationale for employing a qualitative design was premised on the need
to explore the experiences, opinions and perspectives of O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14 midlevel
managers on the effectiveness of TBR in the military decision making process. It was
considered due to its appropriateness in answering the research questions as compared to
other research approaches.
A comprehensive literature review was conducted on the topic. This eliminated
bias on the TBR decision making framework used by USANCA and DAMO-SSD
midlevel managers. The study will be divided into conceptual, narrative, interpretive,
exploratory, descriptive and contextual research phases. The conceptual phase involved
the formulation of the three research questions that would inform the study. Narrative
will mark the second phase, and it will entail overall research design formulation and
planning. The interpretive phase will be followed by the exploratory phase. In this phase,
the researcher will explore the opinion of USANCA and DAMO-SSD midlevel managers
on the use of TBR decision making framework. Exploratory approach was selected due to
its appropriateness in investigating the phenomenon and all the associated aspects.
Thirdly, a descriptive approach will be employed as it is known to provide an ideal
framework for capturing natural phenomenon. Finally, context will be used as it will help
the researcher to understand the environment and conditions at USANCA and DAMO-
SSD coordinating authorities. It will also prove instrumental in understanding the culture
and management doctrine at these top defense organisations. Thus midlevel managers
will comprise the study population. The target population will be midlevel managers
working at USANCA and DAMO-SSD and who satisfies the study sampling criteria. The
sampled midlevel managers will have to be in O-5/O-4 and GS-13/14 categories. They
will also have to be directly involved in DA and DOD collaborative efforts for countering
the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. The sample size selected will be
adequate in attaining saturation particularly considering the total population of midlevel
managers in the target organisations. The participants will be recruited through email
lists. The sampled middle-level managers will be contacted through their official
organizational emails. The case study qualitative approach will utilize interviews,
observation and evaluation of archived documents. The interview will be the primary
data collection instrument. It will be designed and formulated to capture data that will be
relevant to answering the three research questions. The interview script will be designed
by the researcher and emailed to the supervisors for approval prior to field testing for
purposes of establishing the validity and reliability of the instrument. Ethnography is a
qualitative research design in which the researcher gets immersed in the research
environment with a view of getting first-hand experience with regards to the dynamics of
the study environment. This design was not selected because the current study has time
limitations, while this design requires time. Additionally, this method involves direct
observation which is not the primary research instrument, even though it’s one of the
instruments. A narrative approach involves piecing together fragmented piece of
information obtained from few people, usually one or two to construct a complete story.
The instrument for this design is usually comprehensive interviews and in-depth
documentation review. It was rejected because it omits observation which is one of the
three research instruments to be used in the study. Phenomenological approach is largely
descriptive, and hence ideal for capturing events, activities and phenomenon. It was
rejected because the current study is non-phenomenological and hence there is no need of
conducting a series of interviews as is usually the case with phenomenological studies.
Thirdly, it requires 5-25 interviews to be conducted, which is beyond the scope of the
current study. A case study approach involves a comprehensive study of a specific
situation as opposed to conducting a blanket survey. It is used by qualitative researchers
to narrow down a wide field of study with the view of deriving a researchable topic. Its
efficacy was premised on the fact that the current study seeks to establish the perspective
of middle-level managers on the use of Simon’s Theory of Bounded Rationality (TBR)
decision model. Thirdly, it was selected because unlike other designs, it can focus on a
single organization. The primary source of data will be participant interviews where O-
5/O-4 and GS-13/14 middle-level managers at USANCA and DAMO-SSD will be
interviewed. A sample size of twenty (20) middle-level managers will be selected
through stratified, non-probabilistic sampling where 10 participants will be drawn from
each organization. The interview population sample size will be n=20. Similarly, the
observation sample size will be, n=20 and will involve the researcher going into the study
organisations to observe the participants. The sample size for the archived documents
will be n=50. Data collection will be through structured interviews administered by the
researcher. The interview will be guided by an interview script which will comprise
structured, pre-defined questions to be answered by the participants. After data collection,
data coding will be conducted. Data collection and analysis will involve capturing and
analyzing data using Envivo. During data coding, the researcher will ensure that the data
captured is relevant and that it specifically answers the research questions. Data
processing and analysis will then follow using diverse triangulation techniques.
The study makes assumption that all middle level managers understand the
Simon’s TBR decision model, have a direct association with the specific study objectives,
are equally informed and knowledgeable with regards to TBR decision making and
finally, that their views will be the correct representation of the collective perception of
all middle-level managers at USANCA and DAMO-SSD. The study limitations will
encompass a focus on perceptions, observation and the extent to which Simon’s TBR
decision model impacts the enduring capability of USANCA and DAMO-SSD middle-
level managers. Other limitations will include time constraints, financial limitations,
limited access to authoritative archived data sources, accessing middle level managers
and access to relevant military peer reviewed sources that were published in the past five
years. Ethical assurances will include approval from IRB prior to data collection,
upholding ethical considerations, assurance on anonymity and confidentiality of
information, respect for the rights of participants, equal treatment of individual
perspectives, strict adherence to non-disclosure policy and IRB’s data storage
requirement. Lastly, a copy of the research approval letter will be attached in the
appendix of the dissertation manuscript.
References
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Alex da, M. P., Näslund, D., & Jasmand, C. (2012). Logistics case study based research:
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