Discussing incentives to conserve marine biodiversity conservation within the
framework of impure public goods.
Abstract
When the environmental public goods or items are available at a nations scale or below,
the rate of failure by the markets to supply the public goods can only be offset by the
activities of the national governments. There are many national and international
agencies that are responsible for the provision and supply of the environment public
goods. The examples of such bodies are the habitat for endangered species that are
rare globally, clean water and other environmental health protection agencies. There
are also many other mitigation systems for obtaining private provision at the national
level for public goods. 1
Introduction
1 Madsen, B., Carroll, N. and Moore, K.., Offset and Compensation Programs Worldwide, Washington,
Ecosystem market place.
Discussing incentives to conserve marine biodiversity 2
Most Economists likely prefer private party control as a market incentive that leaves the
allocation of resources to the private entities in the market and the government retains
the oversight role of providing the legal mechanism and the institutional framework
within which the market operates. The government does not interfere with the
management of the daily activities and the operations of the businesses in the
economy. Economic incentives are primarily consists of taxes chargeable and the
trading rights 2 . The major market incentives are mostly harvest taxes and the quota
trading. The tax level charged is primarily determined by the institutional setting. The
security of the property rights generally determines the rate of taxation which has to
account for the external costs and the user effects on the environment. The ecological
cost and the forgone values of the external costs have to be factored when determining
the optimal rate of the tax chargeable.
Quota trading rights are established by setting the aggregate cap on harvesting or
drilling exercises by issuance of rights to harvest or drill that can be generally traded.
Tradable emission permits can then be allocated via bidding where the highest bidder
wins. This feature enables the most efficient firm will eventually stay in business. The
trading rights will end up to firms that have the lowest marginal costs of drilling or
harvesting the natural resources. Extensive cost savings in the management of
fisheries, other marine and aquatic life and pollution control can be achieved through
the least cost of harvesting techniques. 3
2Bulte, E., Van Kooten and Swanson, Economic Incentives and Wildlife Conservation, Working papers, 2003.
3 Weitzman, M.L. land Fees Vs Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish stocks, Journal of the Environmental
Economics and Management (2002) 43: 325- 38.
Discussing incentives to conserve marine biodiversity 3
Depending on the magnitude and the rate of payoff of the trading rights the countries
involved will either have stronger or weaker motivation to commit more resources for the
trading companies. Most International Environmental Public Goods (IEPGS) are global
and their interest in conservation lies in genetic diversity where future evolution heavily
depends on it, the environmental mitigation on climate change, emerging infectious
diseases control, management and control of the sea, control of the acid rain, multi
country river management and the general protection of water sheds. 4
The Millennium Ecosystem assessment in 2003 indicated that the relationship that
exists between the services of the ecosystem and its components which are climatically
or environmentally regulated for instance through carbon sequestration. This is supplied
as mostly as an addictive public good which is pure or the protection of the water shed
that’s generally addictive 5 but it an impure public good. 6 A critical feature of the IEPG is
their partly dependence on natural hydrological and at times on atmospheric flows and
other times on social links internationally that’s the flow of people, goods and also
information. The international reach of the carbon sequestration is owned by the
circulation system but the international reach of disease control and its circulation is
owned by the global trade and transmitted by air transportation businesses. The more
integrated the world is turning into, the more the environmental public goods are
becoming more available and within the reach of many other markets globally.
4 Touza, J. and Perrings, C., Strategic Behavior and the scope for unilateral provision of transboundary ecosystem
services and the international public goods. strategic behavior and the environment (2011) 1: 89 -117
5 Holzinger, K.., Aggregation technology of common goods and its strategic consequences: Global
warming, biodiversity and sitting conflicts. European journal of political research, 40, (2001) 117 – 138
6 Touza, J. and Perrings, C., Strategic Behavior and the scope for unilateral provision of transboundary ecosystem
services and the international public goods. strategic behavior and the environment (2011) 1: 89 -117
Discussing incentives to conserve marine biodiversity 2
The incentives in business trades also enhances human mobility as the increased
movement of services and also other goods as well as information spreads just as much
as the transmission of diseases and air pollution now known as environmental public
bad internationally 7 . Cross borders activities and other transnational operations also
contribute to the environmental public bad. More systematic risks have also increased
like the changes in global warming and other climatical changes. International regimes
are increasingly becoming more powerful and influential. Research and development
scientific research has led to more discoveries into the treatment of certain diseases
while others are still developing methods of containing terminal diseases like cancer.
IEPG provide benefits that extend beyond national borders and spill over to other
countries. If the marginal benefit received from the public good that accrues to the
country locally is less than its marginal costs locally then the incentive will be less
attractive and it will be needless to continue providing the good 8 . However if the
marginal benefits received from the public good that accrues to the country locally is
less than its marginal costs but it benefits other external markets or countries it will be
an incentive to continue producing it will be a public good but the country must be able
to support its production processes together with the foreign demands. 9
7 Bulte, E., Van Kooten and Swanson, Economic Incentives and Wildlife Conservation, Working papers, 2003.
8 Arriagada, R. & Perrings, Paying for international Environmental Public Goods, Ambio, 2011, 40: 798 – 806.
9 Ferroni, M. and Mody, A. Global incentives for international public goods: Introduction and overview, In
international goods public: incentives, measurements and financing, ed. M. Ferroni and Mody, A.
Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002.
Discussing incentives to conserve marine biodiversity 3
To conclude, marine biodiversity management by most governments target genetic
diversity where future evolution of the marine life is protected and the interest in
conservation lies mostly in the general incentives that can be derived from it. Some
governments invest in marine research to develop different way of marketing marine
tourism and finding different methods of benefitting from the whole marine life. The
constant oil spills on the seas and the destruction of marine life by toxic emissions of
manufacturing companies explains the nature of most governments determination to
benefit from all ecosystems without regarding the effects of the impurities to the
environment. The incentives to benefit from the resources found within the aquatic
habitat overrides the importance most governments attach to the marine life. However,
most nations universally have recognized the bad effects of pollution on the
environment and have ratified the United Nations environment programs charter on
environmental protection. The environmental mitigation on climate change, emerging
infectious diseases control, management and control of the sea, control of the acid rain,
multi country river management and the general protection of water sheds 10 are some
of the measures that have been taken by foreign governments to conserve the
environment. Marine conservation in developing countries has not been given a lot of
prominence as most of their economies are struggling to meet the basic requirements of
their citizens and other economic challenges that come with trade expansion and
growth. The conservation efforts in these countries have however been supported by
international agencies like the UNEP and The UN habitat which have continued to fund
10 Touza, J. and Perrings, C., Strategic Behavior and the scope for unilateral provision of transboundary ecosystem
services and the international public goods. strategic behavior and the environment (2011) 1: 89 -117
Discussing incentives to conserve marine biodiversity 2
conservation efforts as well as providing oversight responsibilities and regulation
measures in an effort to assist the local governments.
References
Arriagada, R. & Perrings, Paying for international Environmental Public Goods, Ambio,
2011, 40: 798 – 806.
Bulte, E., Van Kooten and Swanson, Economic Incentives and Wildlife Conservation,
Working papers, 2003.
Ferroni, M. and Mody, A. Global incentives for international public goods: Introduction
and overview. In international goods public: incentives, measurements and
financing, ed. M. Ferroni and Mody, A. Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers,
2002.
Madsen, B., Carroll, N. and Moore, K. Offset and Compensation Programs Worldwide:
Washington, Ecosystem market place, 2010.
Discussing incentives to conserve marine biodiversity 3
Touza, J. and Perrings, C., Strategic Behavior and the scope for unilateral provision of
transboundary ecosystem services and the international public goods. Strategic
behavior and the environment (2011) 1: 89 -117
Weitzman, M.L. land Fees Vs Harvest Quotas with Uncertain Fish stocks, Journal of the
Environmental Economics and Management (2002) 43: 325- 38.